IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


// 


7 


m 


^c 


^ 


||_M_ 
11.25 


■^  Uii   ■2.2 

■HUl. 


Hiotographic 

_,Sciences 

Corporation 


37 


<v 


V 


<^ 


^ 


:3  WBT  MAIN  STRUT 

WIBSTIR.N.Y.  MSM 

(71«)t72-4S03 


v\ 


'^ 


■  > 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproduutions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


Tachnical  and  Bibliographic  Notas/Notaa  tachniquas  at  bibliographiquat 


Tha 
toti 


Tha  Inttituta  has  attamptad  to  obtain  tha  bast 
original  copy  ovailabia  for  filming.  Faaturas  of  this 
copy  which  may  ba  bibliographically  uniqua, 
which  may  altar  any  of  tha  imagas  in  tha 
reproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  changa 
tha  usual  mathod  of  filming,  ara  chackad  balow. 


0 


D 


n 


n 


□ 


Colourad  covars/ 
Couvarture  da  coulaur 


I      I    Covars  damagad/ 


Couvarture  andommagia 

Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restauria  et/ou  pelliculAe 


I      I    Cover  title  missing/ 


Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

Coloured  maps/ 

Cartes  gAographiques  en  couleur 

Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bieue  ou  noir9) 

Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 
Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 


D 


Bound  with  other  material/ 
Reli6  avec  d'autres  documents 

Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  reliure  serr^e  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
distortion  le  long  de  ia  marge  intirieure 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restoration  may 
appear  within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  se  peut  que  certaines  pages  blanches  ajoutias 
lors  dune  restauration  apparaissant  dans  la  taxta. 
mais,  lorsque  cela  Atait  possible  cas  pages  n'ont 
pas  6ti  filmias. 

Additional  comments:/ 
Commentaires  supplAmentaires; 


L'Institut  a  microfilm*  la  mailleur  exempiaira 
qu'il  lui  a  At*  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details 
da  cat  exempiaira  qui  sont  paut-Atra  uniques  du 
point  da  vue  bibliographiqua,  qui  peuvent  modifier 
una  image  raproduite.  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une 
modification  dans  la  mAthoda  normale  de  filmage 
sont  indiquAs  ci-dessous. 


r       Coloured  pages/ 


a 


Pages  de  couleur 

Pages  damaged/ 
Pages  endommagAes 

Pages  restored  and/oi 

Pages  restaurAes  et/ou  peiliculAes 

Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxei 
Pages  dAcolorAes,  tachatAes  ou  piquAes 

Pages  detached/ 
Pages  d&tachAes 

Showthrough> 
Transparence 

Quality  of  prir 

Qualit*  inigale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  materii 
Comprend  du  material  supplAmentaire 

Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Edition  disponible 


I      I  Pages  damaged/ 

I      I  Pages  restored  and/or  laminated/ 

r~1  Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 

I      I  Pages  detached/ 

ry\  Showthrough/ 

r~~|  Quality  of  print  varies/ 

I      I  Includes  supplementary  material/ 

I — I  Only  edition  available/ 


Tha 
posi 
ofti 
film 


Orifl 

bagi 

tha 

sion 

oth« 

firat 

aion 

oril 


Tha 
shal 
TINI 
whii 

Mai 

diffi 
aiitii 
bagI 
righ 
raqi 
mat 


Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  ref limed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Las  pages  totalament  ou  partiallement 
obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une  pelure, 
etc.,  ont  iti  filmAes  A  nouveau  de  fa^on  A 
obtanir  la  mailleure  image  possible. 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  film*  au  taux  da  r*ductlon  indlqu*  ci-dassous. 

10X  14X  18X  22X 


26X 


30X 


12X 


16X 


20X 


a4x 


28X 


32X 


I 

tails 
I  du 
odifiir 
un« 
mage 


TIm  copy  filmMl  hor*  has  b««n  r«produc«d  thanks 
to  th«  -^onoroaity  of: 

Univtrtity  of  British  Columbia  Library 


Tha  iinagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  baat  quality 
posaibia  conatdaring  tha  condition  and  iagibiiity 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  icaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  apacif icationa. 


L'axamplaira  f limA  f ut  raproduit  grica  i  la 
gAniroait*  da: 

Univtrsity  of  Britiiti  Columbia  Library 


Laa  imagaa  suivantaa  ont  4tA  raproduitas  avac  la 
plua  grand  soin,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattat*  da  l'axamplaira  filmi,  at  an 
conformity  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
filmaga. 


Original  copiaa  in  printad  papar  covars  ara  filmad 
baginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  laat  paga  with  a  |>rintad  or  iilustratad  impraa- 
sion,  or  tha  bacit  covar  whan  appropriata.  All 
othar  original  copiaa  ara  filmad  baginning  on  tha 
first  paga  with  a  printad  or  liluatratad  impras- 
sion,  and  anding  on  tha  last  paga  with  a  printad 
or  liluatratad  impraasion. 


Tha  laat  racordad  frama  on  aach  microfiche 
shall  contain  tha  symbol  ^^-  (moaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  tha  symbol  Y  (moaning  "END"), 
whichavar  applies. 


Lea  axempiairas  originaux  dont  la  couvarture  an 
papier  est  imprim4a  sont  filmte  9n  commenpant 
par  la  premier  plat  at  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
darnlAre  paga  qui  comporta  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'iliustration,  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  las  autras  axempiairas 
originaux  sont  fiimAs  en  commenpant  par  la 
pramiAre  paga  qui  comporta  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'iliustration  at  en  terminant  par 
ia  darniire  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparcltra  sur  la 
darniire  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  seion  ie 
cas:  ;e  symbols  -^m-  signifie  "A  SUIVRE '.  Ie 
symbols  ▼  signifie  "FIN". 


IMaps.  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc..  peuvent  Atre 
fiimAs  i  des  taux  de  reduction  diffArents. 
Lorsque  Ie  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichi.  il  est  fiimA  A  partir 
da  Tangle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  A  droite. 
et  de  haut  en  bas.  an  prenant  la  nombre 
d'images  nAcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
iliustrant  la  mtthoda. 


rrata 
:o 


pelure, 
1  A 


3 

32X 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

0 


B  A 


A 


^illp 


I'mmmimmvmwvrvmi^^  I 


^M 


^ 


/-' 


«.  .*  ■  Jk 


THE 


OREGON    QUESTION. 


•      >i 


BY 


^       » 

'      4 


ALBERT    GALLATIN. 


NEW    YORK; 
BARTLETT   &   WELF0RD,7   ASTOR  HOUSE 


1846. 


f 


«~  iitrjip   iiliiiP'W.i 


V 


( 


■MP99B 


V 


THE 


OEEGON    QUESTION. 


4 


BY 


ALBERT    GALLATIN. 


'i  M 


NEW    YORK: 
BARTLETT    &WELF0RD,7   ASTOR HOUSE 

1846. 


i'  1 


t ; 


H.    CRAIGHEAD,    PRI.VTER,    112    FULTON    9TRKET,    NEW    YORK. 


THE   OREGON   QUESTION. 


NUMBER  I 


I  HAD  been  a  pioneer  in  collecting  facts  and  stating  the  case. 
The  only  materials  within  my  reach  consisted  of  the  accounts  of 
voyages  previously  published,  (including  that  of  Maurelle,  in  Bar- 
rington's  Miscellanies),  of  the  varied  and  important  infoi  mation 
derived  from  Humboldt's  New  Spain,  and  of  the  voyage  of  the 
Sutil  and  Mexicano,  the  introduction  to  which  contains  a  brief 
official  account  of  the  Spanish  discoveries.  The  statement  of  the 
case  was  the  best  I  was  able  to  make  with  the  materials  on  hand, 
and  may  be  found  defective  in  many  respects.  Since  that  time  manu- 
script journals  of  several  of  the  voyages  have  been  obtained  at  Ma- 
drid. New  facts  have  thus  been  added  ;  others  have  been  better 
analyzed,  and  some  errors  rectified.  Arguments  which  had  been 
only  indicated  have  been  enforced,  and  new  views  have  been 
suggested.  1  ue  subject,  indeed,  seems  to  be  exhausted  ;  and  it 
would  be  difhcult  to  add  anything  to  the  able  correspondence 
between  the  two  Governments  which  has  been  lately  published. 

Ministers  charged  with  diplomatic  .llscussions  are  not,  however, 
in  those  official  papers  intended  for  publication,  to  be  considered  as 
philosophers  calmly  investigating  the  questions,  with  no  other 
object  but  to  elicit  truth.  They  are  always,  to  a  certain  extent* 
advocates,  who  use  their  best  endeavors  to  urge  and  even  strain  the 


w 


reasons  that  may  be  alleged  in  favor  of  the  claims  set  up  by  their 
Governments  ;  and  in  the  same  manner  to  repel,  if  not  to  deny,  all 
that  may  be  adduced  by  the  other  party.  Such  official  papers  are 
in  fact  appeals  to  public  opinion,  and  generally  published  when 
there  remains  no  hope  to  conclude  for  the  present  an  amicable 
arrangement. 

But,  though  acting  in  that  respect  as  advocates,  diplomatists  are 
essentially  ministers  of  peace,  whose  constant  and  primary  duty  is 
mutually  to  devise  conciliatory  means  for  the  adjustment  of  conflict- 
ing pretensions,  for  the  continuance  of  friendly  relations,  for  pre- 
venting war,  or  for  the  restoration  of  peace.  It  has  unfortunately 
happened  that  on  this  occasion,  both  Governments  have  assumed 
such  absolute  and  exclusive  grounds  as  to  have  greatly  increased, 
at  least  for  the  present,  the  obstacles  to  an  amicable  arrangement. 

It  is  morally  impossible  for  the  bulk  of  the  people  of  any  country 
thoroughly  to  investigate  a  subject  so  complex  as  that  of  the 
respective  claims  to  the  Oregon  territory  ;  and,  for  obvious  reasons, 
it  is  much  less  understood  by  the  great  mass  of  the  population  in 
England  than  in  the  United  States.  Everywhere,  when  the 
question  is  between  the  country  and  a  foreign  nation,  the  people  at 
large,  impelled  by  natural  and  patriotic  feelings,  will  rally  around 
their  Government.  For  the  consequences  that  may  ensue,  those 
who  are  entrusted  with  the  direction  of  the  foreign  relations  are 
alone  responsible.  Whatever  may  be  the  cause,  to  whomsoever 
the  result  may  be  ascribed,  it  appears  from  the  general  style  of  the 
periodical  press,  that,  with  few  exceptions,  the  people,  both  in 
Great  Britain  and  in  the  United  States,  are  imbued  with  the  belief 
that  the  contested  territory  belongs  exclusively  to  themselves,  and 
that  any  concession  which  might  be  made  would  be  a  boon  to  the 
other  party.  Such  opinions,  if  sustained  by  either  Government  and 
accompanied  by  corresponding  measures,  must  necessarily  lead  to 
immediate  collisions,  and  probably  to  war.  Yet,  a  war  so  calami- 
tous in  itself,  so  fatal  to  the  general  interests  of  both  countries,  is 
almost  universally  deprecated,  without  distinction  of  parties,  by  all 
the  rational  men  who  are  not  carried  away  by  the  warmth  of  their 
feelings. 

In  the  present  state  of  excitement,  an  immediate  amicable  arrange- 


ment  is  almost  hopeless  ;  time  is  necessary  before  the  two  (iovern- 
mcnts  can  be  induced  to  recede  from  their  extreme  pretensions. 
In  the  meanwhile,  nothing,  as  it  seems  to  me,  should  for  the  present 
be  done,  which  might  increase  the  excitement,  aggravate  the  dilR- 
culties,  or  remove  the  only  remaining  barrier  against  immediate 
collision. 

The  United  States  claim  a  right  of  sovereignty  over  the  whole 
territory.  The  pretensions  of  the  British  Government,  so  far  as 
they  have  been  heretofore  exhibited,  though  not  extending  to  a 
claim  of  absolute  sovereignty  over  the  whole,  are  yet  such  as  cannot 
be  admitted  by  the  United  States,  and,  if  persisted  in,  must  lead  to 
a  similar  result. 

If  the  claim  of  Great  Britain  be  properly  analyzed,  it  will  be 
found  that,  although  she  has  incidentally  discussed  other  questions, 
she  in  fact  disregards  every  other  claim  but  that  of  actual  oecu- 
pancy,  and  that  she  regards  as  such  the  establishment  of  tr.iding 
factories  by  her  subjects.  She  accordingly  claims  a  participation 
in  the  navigation  of  the  river  Columbia,  and  would  make  that  river 
the  boundary  between  the  two  Powers.  This  utter  disregard  of 
the  rights  of  discovery,  particularly  of  that  of  the  mouth,  sources, 
and  course  of  a  river,  of  the  principle  of  contiguity,  and  of  every 
other  consideration  whatever,  cannot  be  admitted  by  the,  United 
States.  The  offer  of  a  detached  defenceless  territory,  with  a  single 
port,  and  the  reciprocal  offisrs  of  what  are  called  free  ports,  cannot 
be  viewed  but  as  derisory.  An  amicable  arrangement  by  way  of 
compromise  cannot  be  effected  without  a  due  regard  to  the  claims 
advanced  by  both  parties,  and  to  the  expediency  of  the  dividing 
line.*  *- 

An  equitable  division  must  have  reference  not  only  to  the  extent 
of  territory,  but  also  to  the  other  peculiar  advantages  attached  to 
each  portion  respectively. 

From  and  including  Fuca  Straits,  the  country  extending  north- 
wardly abounds  with  convenient  sea-ports.     From  the  42d  degree 

*  I  allude  here  only  to  the  compromise  proposed  by  Great  }3ritain.  lier 
actual  claim,  as  explicitly  stated  by  herself,  ■  ♦o  the  whole  territory, 
limited  to  a  right  of  joint  occupancy,  in  common  with  other  States,  leaving 
the  right  of  excluBive  dominion  in  abeyance. 


of  latitutle  to  those  Stnilts,  there  is  Iml  one  port  of  any  importance, 
the  mouth  of  the  River  Coluinlia ;  and  this  is  of  (hflicult  and 
dangerous  access,  and  cannot  achnit  ships  of  war  of  a  hir^e  size. 
It  is  iinpoitant  only  as  a  port  of  exports.  As  one  of  common 
resort  fur  supplies,  or  asylum,  in  case  of  need,  for  the  numberless 
American  vessels  en^ai^ed  in  the  ri.>heriesor  commerce  of  the  Pacific, 
it  would  be  almost  useless,  even  if  in  the  exclusive  possession  of 
the  United  States.  It  must  also  be  observed  that  the  navigable 
channel  of  the  river,  from  its  mouth  to  Puget's  Island,  is,  according 
to  Vancouver,  close  along  the  northern  shore.  Great  Britain  pro- 
poses that  till'  river  should  be  the  boundary,  and  that  the  United 
States  should  bo  content  with  the  possession  of  the  port  it  oflered, 
in  common  with  herself.  It  is  really  unneces«Ty  to  dwell  on  the 
consetjuences  of  such  an  anangenient.  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that, 
in  case  of  war  between  the  two  countries,  it  would  leave  the  United 
States  without  a  single  poit,  and  give  to  Great  Britain  the  indis- 
putable and  exclusive  contiol  over  those  seas  and  their  commerce. 

The  first  and  indispensitlle  step  towards  an  amicable  arrange- 
ment consists  in  the  investigation,  not  so  much  of  the  superiority  ol 
one  claim  o\er  the  other,  as  of  the  question  whether  there  be 
sufficient  grouad:i  to  sustain  the  exclusive  pretensions  of  either 
Government. 

If  the  claim  of  the  United  States  to  the  whole  of  the  contested 
territory  can  be  sustained  against  Great  Britain,  or  if  the  pretensions 
of  this  Power  can  to  their  full  extent  be  maintained  against  the 
United  Slates,  it  must  be,  by  either  party  assuming  that  the  other 
has  no  oi)posite  claim  of  any  kind  whatever,  that  there  are  no 
doubtful  and  debatable  questions  pending  between  the  two  countries. 
This,  if  true  and  maintained,  must  n(!cessarily  lead  to  war,  unless 
one  of  the  two  Powers  should  yield  what  it  considers  as  its  absolute 
right.  But,  if  there  be  any  such  debatable  (juestions,  the  way  is 
still  open  for  negotiations  ;  and  both  powers  may  recede  from  their 
extreme  pretensions,  without  any  abandonment  of  positive  rights, 
without  disgrace,  without  impairing  national  honor  and  dignity. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  the  title  of  the  Unite<i  States  to  the 
whole  Oregon  territory  was  maintained  by  irrefragable  facts  and 
arguments.     These  must  be  sought  for  in  the  correspondence  lately 


published.  They  cont.l.>t — first,  ol  llic  assertion  ol  tlie  aiici<'n( 
claim  of  Spain  to  tht-  alKSoIute  sovert'if^nly  ovt  r  thf  whole  north- 
west coast  of  America  as  far  north  as  the  Gist  degree  of  north  h»ti- 
tude.  Secondly,  of  the  «  uinidated  proofs  which  sustain  the  claims 
of  the  United  States  to  the  various  jjorlions  of  the  territory  (whe- 
ther in  tlieir  own  right,  or  as  derived  from  the  actjuisition  of 
Louisiana  and  the  Spanish  discoveries),  and  ol  t'.e  refutation  of  tlu* 
argumints  adduced  by  ihe  other  party.  The  fust  mentioned  posi- 
tion would,  if  it  could  be  sustained,  be  sulfieient  to  prove,  and  is, 
as  I  think,  the  (*iily  one  that  could  prove,  the  absolute  and  com- 
plete right  of  the  United  States  to  the  whole  contested  territory. 

It  is  un«loubtedly  true  that  "  Spain  con.ji<i  red  the  nortiiwest 
coast  of  America  as  exclusively  her  own;"  thitt  this  claim  "  had 
been  asserted  by  her,  and  maintained  with  liiu  most  vigilant  jea- 
lousy, ever  since  the  discovery  of  the  Ai.ie.ican  continent,  or  near- 
ly three  centm'ies,  as  far  iioith  as  her  settlements  or  missions  ex- 
tended." There  were  two  ways  of  examinmg  the  soundness  ol 
that  claim ;  an  investigation  of  the  principles  on  which  it  was 
founded,  and  an  appeal  to  precedents.  The  Secretary  of  State  has 
abstained  from  discussing  t'le  principle  ;  but  he  has  said  that  tiic 
claim  of  Spain  to  sovereii;nty  "  had  never  been  seriously  (juestion- 
ed  by  any  European  nation  :  that  it  had  been  acquiesced  in  by  all 
European  Governments."  This  appears  to  me  the  most  vulnera- 
ble part  of  his  arguments. 

The  early  charters  of  the  British  monarchs  to  the  colonies  bor- 
dering on  the  Atlantic,  extended  from  sea  to  sea,  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Pacific  ocean,  with  the  single  excej)tion  which  excluded  from 
the  grants  the  places  actually  occupied  by  the  subjects  of  any 
Christian  nation.  The  right  of  prior  occupancy  was  recognized  ; 
but  the  general  claim  of  Spain  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  whole 
coast  bordering  on  the  Pacific  was  utterly  disregarded.  Mad  that 
claim  been  considered  as  un(juestionable,had  it  been  acquiesced  in, 
it  never  could  have  been  supposed  that,  in  any  case  whatever,  Eng- 
land could  have  a  right  to  bestow  on  her  subjects  a  single  foot  of 
land  bordering  on  the  Pacilic. 

Coming  down  to  modern  times,  the  only  nations  which  have  set 
up  any  claims  or  attempted  any  settlements  on  the  Pacific,  north  of 


8 


the  country  actually  occupied  by  the  Spaniards,  are  Russia,  Great 
Britain,  and  the  United  States.  All  three  have  asserted  claims  to 
the  northwestern  coasts  of  America,  irreconcilable  with  the  uni- 
versal sovereignty  claimed  by  Spain  :  Russia  and  England,  from  the 
time  when  their  flags  first  floated  along  the  coast  and  their  subjects 
landed  on  its  shores;  the  United  States  from  a  similar  dale,  or  at 
least  from  the  time  when  they  acquired  Louisiana. 

If  the  right  of  Spain  was  absolute  and  exclusive  to  the  whole, 
there  was  no  reason  why  it  should  not  have  extended  beyond  the 
6 1st  degree  of  latitude.  The  right  of  Russia  was  founded  only  on 
her  discoveries  and  the  establishment  of  some  trading  factories. 
She  respected  the  right  of  Spain  only  as  far  as  it  did  not  interfere 
with  her  own  claim.  She  has,  in  fact,  extended  this  more  than 
six  degrees  further  south  ;  and  to  this  the  United  States,  who  had 
acquired  all  the  rights  of  Spain,  have  assented  by  a  solemn  treaty. 
Whatever  might  be  the  boundary  acquiesced  in  by  Spain,  it  was 
not  Russia  which  recognized  the  claim  of  Spain ;  it  was  Spain  which 
recognized  that  her  claim  was  not  unlimited.  And,  let  it  be  also 
observed,  that,  since  Spain  still  claimed  as  far  north  as  the  61st 
degree  of  north  latitude  (the  southern  limit  of  the  Russian  facto- 
ries when  first  visited  by  Spanish  navigators),  the  United  States,  if 
they  believed  the  Spanish  right  absolute  and  exclusive,  ought  not 
to  have  ceded  to  Russia  a  country  extending  more  than  six  degrees 
of  latitude  along  the  shores  of  the  Pacific.  ; 

Great  Britain  contested  the  exclusive  claim  of  Spain  from  the 
year  1778,  the  date  of  Cook's  third  voyage ;  and  he  w^as  the  first 
British  navigator  that  had  for  more  than  two  centuries  appeared  on 
those  coasts.  This  doctrine  she  has  maintained  ever  since.  She 
did  not  resist  the  exclusive  claim  of  Spain  by  virt\ie  of  the  Nootka 
convention,  but  prior  to  it.  It  was  on  that  ground  that  she  impe- 
riously demanded  indemnity  and  restoration  for  the  property  and 
factory  of  one  of  her  subjects,  which  had  been  forcibly  taken  by 
the  Spanish  Government.  She  even  threatened  war ;  and  the 
Nootka  convention  was  the  result  of  those  transactions.  "Whatever 
construction  may  at  this  time  be  given  to  that  instrument,  it  is  cer- 
tain at  least  that  Spain  by  it  conceded  a  portion  of  the  absolute  and 
sovereign  right  she  had  till  then  asserted ;  that  she  yielded  the 


9 


right  of  trade  with  the  natives  on  all  that  part  of  the  coast  lying 
north  of  her  actual  settlements  ;  and  that,  by  suffering  the  ultimate 
right  of  sovereignty  to  remain  in  abeyance,  she  made  that  preten- 
sion questionable  which  she  had  contended  could  not  be  called  in 
question. 

With  respect  to  the  United  States,  without  recurring  to  former 
negotiations  which  were  not  attended  with  any  result,  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  advert  to  the  convention  between  them  and  Great  Britain 
of  the  year  18 18,  concluded  prior  to  the  date  of  the  treaty  by 
which  they  acquired  the  claims  of  Spain  to  the  territory  north  of 
the  42d  degree  of  north  latitude. 

The  United  States  at  that  time  distinctly  claimed,  in  their  own 
right  and  independent  of  the  Spanish  claims,  that  the  boundary 
along  the  49th  parallel,  which  had  been  agreed  on  as  that  between 
them  and  Great  Britain,  from  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  to  the  Stony 
Mountains,  should  be  extended  to  the  Pacific.  To  this  division  of 
territory  Ureat  Britain  would  not  accede ;  and  the  provision  for  a 
joint  occupancy  during  the  next  ensuing  years  was  substituted.  A 
clause  was  inserted  that  the  agreement  should  not  be  taken  to  affect 
the  claims  of  any  other  Power  or  State  to  any  part  of  the  country 
west  of  the  Stony  Mountains.  This  provision  clearly  referred  to 
the  claims  of  Russia  and  Spain.  The  northern  and  southern  boun- 
daries of  the  country,  which  the  two  contracting  parties  might 
claim,  were  left  undefined  :  Great  Britain  probably  thought  herself 
bound  by  the  Nootka  convention  to  respect  the  Spanish  claims  to 
the  extent  provided  by  that  instrument :  the  United  States  could 
not  but  recognize  those  derived  from  discovery,  with  which  they 
were  at  that  time  but  imperfectly  aco"?inted,  since  their  own 
claims  were  in  a  great  degree  derived  from  a  similar  source.  But 
the  convention  decisively  proves  that  the  United  States  did  not 
acquiesce  in  the  antiquated  claim  of  Spain  to  the  absolute  and  ex- 
clusive sovereignty  of  the  whole  country ;  since,  if  they  had  re- 
cognized that  prior  claim  to  the  whole,  they  could  have  had  none 
whatever  to  any  portion  of  it. 

It  is  therefore  undeniable  that  the  assertion  of  the  Spanish  claim 
of  absolute  sovereignty  cannot  be  sustained  by  a  presumed  ac- 
quiescence on  the  part  of  the  only  nations  which  now  claim  the 


.1' 


10 


1,1 


country.  It  may  perhaps  be  said  that  their  opposition  came  too 
late,  and  that  they  neglected  too  long  to  protest  against  the  Spanish 
pretension  on  the  Pacific.  No  stress  will  be  laid  on  Drake's  voy- 
ase,  which  had  a  warlike  character.  But  the  British  charters  to 
their  colonies  show  that  those  pretensions  were  disregarded  at  a 
very  early  date.  There  v,  as  no  occasion  for  opposition  or  direct 
denial;,  with  respect  to  the  Pacific,  until  the  attention  of  other  na- 
tions was  directed  towards  that  remote  country.  This  was  neglect- 
ed because  all  the  commercial  nations  were,  in  their  attempts  to 
colonize,  or  to  conquer  the  foreign  and  till  then  unexplored  regions, 
attracted  by  countries  far  more  accessible,  and  were  exclusively 
engaged  in  pursuits  much  more  important.  The  East  Indies  and 
the  West  India  Islands  offered  a  vast  and  lucrative  field  for  com- 
mercial enterprise  and  territorial  acquisition.  With  respect  to  the 
continentof  America,  France,  England,  and  Holland  most  natural- 
ly planted  their  colonies  on  the  nearest  opposite  shores  of  the  At- 
lantic ;  and  they  did  it  in  opposition  to  the  pretended  claim  of  Spain, 
which  extended  to  the  whole  of  America.  Although  strenuously 
engaged  in  extending  those  colonies  westwardly,  these,  in  the  year 
1754,  twenty  years  only  before  Cook's  third  voyage,  hardly  ex- 
tended beyond  the  Mississippi.  What  immediate  interest  could 
then  have  impelled  either  France  or  England  to  enter  a  formal 
protest  against  the  antiquated  claim  of  Spain  to  a  country  with 
which  they  nad  never  attempted  even  to  trade  ?  And  what  op- 
portunity had  occurred  for  doing  it  prior  to  Cook's  voyage  % 

But,  what  is  still  more  conclusive,  the  country  in  question  was 
equally  neglected  by  Spain  herself.  Some  exploring  voyages,  few 
of  which  are  authentic,  were  indeed  made  by  Spanish  navigators ; 
and  the  claims  which  may  be  derived  from  their  discoveries  have 
now  been  transferred  to  the  United  States,  so  far  as  discovery  alone 
can  give  a  claim,  and  no  further.  But,  during  more  than  two 
centuries  that  Spain  had  no  competitor  on  the  Pacific,  there  >vas 
on  her  part  no  occupancy,  no  settlement,  or  attempt  to  make 
a  settlement.  She  had  some  missions  on  the  western  coast  of 
the  peninsula  of  California :  but  her  missions  or  settlements  in 
Northern  or  Now  California  are  of  quite  recent  date ;  that  of  the 
most  southern  (San  Diego)  in  1769,  and  that  of  the  most  northern 


'5 

re 


u 

(San  Francisco)  in  1776,  two  years  only  before  Cook's  arrival  at 
Nootka  Sound. 

In  point  of  fact,  the  contested  territory  had  been  utterly  neg- 
lected by  Spain.  All  the  energies,  such  as  they  were,  of  her 
Mexican  colonies  were  much  more  advantageously  applied  to  the 
improvement  of  the  vast  and  rich  countries  which  they  had  con- 
quered, principally  to  the  discovery  and  working  of  the  richest  and 
most  productive  mines  of  the  precious  metals  as  yet  known. 

Anson's  expedition  was  purely  military,  and  confined  to  southern 
latitudes.  But  the  narrative  drew  the  public  attention  towards  the 
Pacific  ocean,  and  gave  a  new  impulse  to  the  spirit  of  discoveiy. 
Almost  immediately  after  the  peace  of  1763  voyages  were  under- 
taken for  that  purpose  by  the  Governments  of  England  and  France : 
the  Pacific  w^as  explored :  the  Russians  on  the  other  hand  had, 
more  than  thirty  years  before,  ascertained  the  continuity  of  the 
American  continent  from  Behiing's  Straits  to  Mount  St.  Ehas. 
It  was  then,  and  not  till  then,  that  Spain,  or  rather  the  Mexican 
Government,  awakening  from  its  long  lethargy,  extended  its  mis- 
sions to  New  California.  In  the  year  1774,  Perez,  with  his  pilot, 
Martinez,  sailed  as  far  north  as  the  notthern  extremity  of  Queen 
Charlotte's  Island,  having  anchored  in  Nootka  Sound,  and,  as 
Martinez  asserts,  perceived  the  entrance  of  Fuca's  Straits.  New 
and  important  discoveries  were  made  by  Quadra  and  Heceta  in 
the  year  1775.     The  sequel  is  well  known. 

But  on  what  foundation  did  the  claim  of  Spain  rest  1  If  she 
had  indeed  an  absolute  right  to  the  whole  country  bordering  on 
the  Pacific,  derived  either  from  natural  or  international  law,  or 
from  usages  generally  recognized,  it  matters  but  little,  as  respects 
right,  whether  other  nations  had  acquiesced  in,  or  opposed  her 
claim.  If  there  was  no  foundation  for  that  absolute  and  exclusive 
right  of  sovereignty,  Spain  could  transfer  nothing  more  to  the 
United  States  than  the  legitimate  claims  derived  from  her  dis- 
coveries. 

The  discovery  gives  an  incipient  claim  not  only  to  the  identical 
spot  thus  discovered,  but  to  &  certain  distance  beyond  it.  It  has 
been  admitted  that  the  claim  extends  generally,  though  not  uni- 
versally, as  far  inland  as  the  sources  of  rivers  emptying  into  the 


\V 


n 


sea  where  the  discovery  has  bern  made.  The  distance  to  which 
the  right  or  claim  extends  along  the  sea  shore  may  not  be  precisely 
defined,  and  may  vary  according  to  circumstances.  But  it  never  can 
be  unlimited;  it  has  never  been  recognized  beyond  a  reasonable  ex- 
tent. Spain  was  the  first  European  nation  which  discovered  and 
occupied  Florida.  A  claim  on  that  account  to  the  absolute  sove- 
reignty over  the  whole  of  the  Atlantic  shores  as  far  as  Hudson's 
Bay,  or  the  60th  degree  of  latitude,  would  strike  every  one  as 
utterly  absurd.  A  claim  on  the  part  of  Spain  to  the  sovereignty 
of  all  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  derived  from  her  having  established 
missions  in  California,  would  be  similar  in  its  nature  and  extent, 
and  equally  inadmissible.  It  cannot  be  sustained  as  a  natural 
right,  nor  by  the  principles  of  international  law,  nor  by  any 
general  usage  or  precedent.  The  claim  of  Spain  rested  on  no  such 
grounds. 

It  was  derived  from  the  bull  of  Pope  Alexander  VI.,  which  the 
Spanish  monarchs  obtained  in  the  year  1493,  immediately  after  the 
discovery  of  America  by  Columbus.  By  virtue  of  that  bull,  com- 
bined with  another  previously  granted  to  Portugal,  and  with  modi- 
fications respecting  the  division  line  between  the  two  Powers,  the 
Pope  granted  to  them  the  exclusive  sovereignty  over  all  the  dis- 
coveries made  or  to  be  made  in  all  the  heathen  portions  of  the 
globe,  including,  it  must  be  recollected,  all  the  countries  in 
America  bordering  on  the  Atlantic,  as  well  as  those  on  the  Pacific 
ocean.  Yet,  even  at  that  time,  the  Catholic  Kings  of  England 
and  France  did  not  recognize  the  authority  of  the  Pope  on  such 
subjects ;  as  evidently  appears  by  the  voyages  of  Cabot  under  the 
orders  of  Henry  VII.  of  England,  and  of  Cartier  under  those  of  the 
King  of  France,  Francis  I.  Subsequently,  the  colonies  planted  by 
both  countries,  from  Florida  to  Hudson's  Bay,  were  a  practica'f 
and  continued  protest  and  denial  of  the  Spanish  claim  of  absolute 
sovereignty  over  the  whole  of  America :  whilst  the  acquiescence 
of  Spain  was  tantamount  to  an  abandonment  of  that  claim  where 
it  was  resisted.  Ridiculous  as  a  right  derived  from  such  a  source 
may  appear  at  this  time,  it  was  not  then  thus  considered  by  Spain  j 
and  the  western  boundary  of  Brazil  is  to  this  day  regulated  by  the 
^Uvision  line  prescribed  by  the  Pope. 


I  am  not  aware  of  any  other  principle  by  which  the  claim  ever 
was  or  can  be  sustained,  unless  it  be  the  idle  ceremony  of  taking 
possession,  as  it  is  called.  The  celebrated  Spaniard  who  first  dis- 
covered the  Pacific  ocean,  "  Balboa,  advancing  up  to  the  middle 
in  the  waves,  with  his  buckler  and  sword,  took  possession  of  that 
ocean  in  the  name  of  the  King  his  master,  and  vowed  to  defend  it, 
with  his  arms,  against  all  his  enemies." — (Robertson.) 

I  have  dwelt  longer  on  this  subject  than  it  may  seem  to  deserve. 
The  assertion  of  the  solidity  of  this  ancient  exclusive  Spanish 
claim  has  had  an  apparent  effect  on  public  opinion  fatal  to  the 
prospect  of  an  amicable  arrangement.  I  am  also  fully  satisfied 
that  the  resort  to  vulnerable  arguments,  instead  of  strengthening, 
has  a  tendency  to  lessen  the  weight  of  the  multiplied  proofs,  by 
which  the  superiority  of  the  American  over  the  British  claim  has 
been  so  fully  established. 


NUMBER   II 


Hi 


It  has,  it  is  believed,  been  conclusively  proveri  that  the  claim  of 
the  United  States  to  absolute  sovereignty  over  the  whole  Oregon 
territory,  in  virtue  of  the  ancient  exclusive  Spanish  claim,  is  wholly 
unfounded.  The  next  question  is,  whether  the  other  facts  and 
arguments  adduced  by  either  party  establish  a  complete  and  absolute 
title  of  either  to  the  whole ;  for  the  United  States  claim  it  expli- 
citly ;  and,  although  the  British  proposal  of  compromise  did  yield 
a  part,  yet  her  qualified  claim  extends  to  the  whole.  It  has  been 
stated  by  herself  in  the  following  words :  "  Great  Britain  claims  no 
exclusive  sovereignty  over  any  portion  of  that  territory.  Her 
present  claim,  not  in  respect  to  any  part,  but  to  the  whole,  is 
limited  to  a  right  of  joint  occupancy,  in  common  with  other  States, 
leaving  the  right  of  exclusive  dominion  in  abeyance."  And,  again : 
"  The  qualified  rights  which  Great  Britain  now  possesses  over  the 
whole  of  the  territory  in  question,  embrace  the  right  to  navigate 
the  waters  of  those  countries,  the  right  to  settle  in  and  over  any 
part  of  them,  and  the  right  freely  to  trade  with  the  inhabitants  and 
occupiers  of  the  same.  *  *  *  *  *  *  It  is  fully  admitted 
that  the  United  States  possess  the  same  rights ;  but  beyond  they 
possess  none." 

In  the  nature  of  things,  it  seems  almost  impossible  that  a  com- 
plete and  absolute  right  to  any  portion  of  America  can  exist,  unless 
it  be  by  prescriptive  and  undisputed  adxial  possess.on  and  settle- 
ments, or  by  virtue  of  a  treaty. 

At  the  time  when  America  was  discovered,  the  law  of  nations 
was  altogether  unsettled.  More  than  a  century  elapsed  before 
Grotius  attempted  to  Jay  its  foundation  on  Natural  Law  and  the 
moral  precepts  of  Christianity ;  and,  when  sustaining  it  by  prece- 
dents, he  was  compelled  to  recur  to  Rome  and  Greece.     It  was  in 


15 


reality  a  new  case,  to  which  no  ancient  precedents  could  apply,* 
for  which  some  new  rules  must  be  adopted.  Gradually,  some 
general  principles  were  admitted,  never  universally,  in  their  nature 
vague  and  often  conflicting.  For  instance,  discovery  varies,  from 
the  simple  ascertaining  of  the  continuity  of  land,  to  a  minute  explo- 
ration of  its  various  harbors,  rivers,  &c. ;  and  the  rights  derived 
from  it  may  vary  accordingly,  and  may  occasionally  be  claimed  to 
the  same  district  by  different  nations.  There  is  no  precise  rule  for 
regulating  the  time  after  which  the  neglect  to  occupy  would  nullify 
the  right  of  prior  discovery  ;  nor  for  defining  the  extent  of  coast 
beyond  the  spot  discovered  to  which  the  dis(  overer  may  be  entitled, 
or  how  far  inland  his  claim  extends.  The  principle  most  generally 
admitted  was,  that,  in  case  of  a  river,  the  right  extended  to  the 
whole  country  drained  by  that  river  and  its  tributaries.  Even  this 
was  not  universally  conceded.  This  right  might  be  affected  by  a 
simultaneous  or  prior  discovery  and  occupancy  of  some  of  the 
sources  of  such  river  by  another  party ;.  or  it  might  conflict  with  a 
general  claim  of  contiguity.  This  last  claim,  when  extending 
beyond  the  sources  of  rivers  discovered  and  occupied,  is  vague 
and  undefined :  though  it  would  seem  that  it  cannot  exceed  in 
breadth  that  of  the  territory  on  the  coast  originally  discovered  and 
occupied.  A  few  examples  will  show  the  uncertainty  resulting 
from  those  various  claims,  when  they  conflicted  with  each  other. 

The  old  British  charters  extending  from  sea  to  sea  have  already 
been  mentioned.  They  were  foundetl,  beyond  the  sources  of  the 
rivers  emptying  into  the  Atlantic,  on  no  other  principle  than  that 
of  contiguity  or  continuity,  ^he  grant  in  1621  of  Nova  Scotia,  by 
James  the  First,  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  the  river  St.  Lawrence, 
though  C artier  had  more  than  eighty-five  years  before  discovered 
the  mouth  of  that  river  and  ascended  it  as  high  up  as  the  present 
site  of  Montreal,  and  the  French  under  Charaplain  had  several 
years  before  162 1  been  settled  at  Quebec.  But  there  is  another 
case  more  important,  and  still  more  in  point. 

The  few  survivors  of  the  disastrous  expedition  of  Narvaez,  who, 
coming  from  Florida,  did  in  a  most  extraordinary  way  reach  Culia- 

*  Grotius,  however,  sustains  the  right  of  occupation  by  a  maxim  of  the 
Civil  Roman  Code. 


16 


can  on  the  Pacific,  were  the  first  Europeans  who  crossed  the  Mis- 
sissippi. Some  years  later,  Ferdinand  de  Soto,  coming  also  from 
Florida,  did  in  the  year  1541  reach  and  cross  the  Mississippi,  at 
some  place  between  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  and  that  of  the  Arkan- 
sas. He  explored  a  portion  of  the  river  and  of  the  adjacent  country ; 
and,  after  his  death,  Moscoso,  who  succeeded  him  in  command,  did, 
in  the  year  1543,  build  seven  brigantines  or  barques,  in  which, 
with  the  residue  of  his  followers,  he  descended  the  Mississippi,  the 
mouth  of  which  he  reached  in  seventeen  days.  Thence  putting  to 
sea  with  his  frail  vessels,  he  was  fortunate  enough  to  reach  the 
Spanish  port  of  Panuco,  on  the  Mexican  coast.  The  right  of  dis- 
covery clearly  belonged  to  Spain ;  but  she  had  neglected  for  near 
one  hundred  and  fifty  years  to  make  any  settlement  on  the  great 
river  or  any  of  iis  tributaries.  The  French,  coming  from  Canada, 
reached  the  Mississippi  in  the  year  1680,  and  ascended  it  as  high 
up  as  St.  Anthony's  Falls ;  and  La  Salle  descended  it  in  1682  to 
its  mouth.  The  French  Government  did,  in  virtue  of  that  second 
discovery,  claim  the  country,  subsequently  founded  New  Orleans, 
and  forme  1  several  other  settlements  in  the  interior,  on  the  Missis- 
sippi or  its  waters.  Spain  almost  immediately  occupied  Pensacola 
and  Nacogdoches,  in  order  to  check  the  progress  of  the  French  east- 
wardly  and  westwardly ;  but  she  did  not  attempt  to  disturb  them 
in  their  settlements  on  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries.  We  have 
here  the  proof  of  a  prior  right  of  discovery  being  superseded,  when 
too  long  neglected,  by  that  of  actual  occupancy  and  settlement. 

The  French,  by  virtue  of  having  thus  discovered  the  mouth  cf 
the  Mississippi,  of  having  ascended  it  more  than  fifteen  hundred 
miles,  of  having  explored  the  Ohio,  the  Wabash,  and  the  Illinois, 
from  their  respective  mouths  to  their  most  remote  sources,  and  of 
having  formed  several  settlements  as  above  mentioned,  laid  claim 
to  the  whole  country  drained  by  the  main  river  and  its  tributaries. 
They  accordingly  built  forts  at  Le  Boeuf,  high  up  the  Alleghany 
river,  and  on  the  site  where  Pittsburgh  now  stands.  On  the  ground 
of  discovery  or  settlement.  Great  Britain  had  not  the  slightest  claim. 
General,  then  Colonel  Washington,  was  the  first  who,  at  the  age 
of  twenty-two,  and  in  the  year  1754,  planted  the  British  banner  on 
the  Western  waters.    The  British  claim  was  founded  principally 


17 


on  the  ground  of  contiguity,  enforced  by  other  considerations.  The 
strongest  of  these  was,  that  it  could  not  consist  with  natural  law, 
that  the  British  colonies,  with  a  population  of  near  two  millions, 
should  be  confined  to  the  narrow  belt  of  land  between  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Alleghany  Mountains,  and  that  the  right  derived  from  the 
discovery  of  the  main  river  should  be  carried  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  allow  the  French  colonies,  with  a  population  of  fifty  thousand, 
rightfully  to  claim  the  whole  valley  of  the  Mississippi.  The  con- 
test was  decided  by  the  sword.  By  the  treaty  of  peace  of  1763, 
the  Mississippi,  with  the  exception  of  New  Orleans  and  its  imme- 
diate vicinity,  was  made  the  boundary.  The  French  not  only  lost 
all  that  part  of  the  valley  which  lay  east  of  that  river,  but  they 
were  compelled  to  cede  Canada  to  Great  Britain. 

It  may,  however,  happen  that  all  the  various  claims  from  which 
a  title  may  be  derived,  instead  of  pertaining  to  several  Powers, 
and  giving  rise  to  conflicting  pretensions,  are  united  and  rightfully 
belong  to  one  nation  alone.  This  union,  if  entire,  may  jusily  be 
considered  as  giving  a  complete  and  exclusive  title  to  the  sove- 
reignty of  that  part  of  the  country  embraced  by  such  united 
claims. 

The  position  assumed  by  the  British  Government,  that  those  va- 
rious claims  exclude  each  other,  and  that  the  assertion  of  one  for- 
bids an  appeal  to  the  others,  is  obviously  untenable.  All  that  can 
be  said  in  that  respect  is,  that  if  any  one  claim  is  alone  sufficient  to 
establish  a  complete  and  indisputable  title,  an  appeal  to  others  is 
superfluous.  Thus  far,  and  no  farther,  can  the  objection  be  main- 
tained. The  argument  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  in  reality 
was,  that  the  Government  considered  the  title  derived  from  the 
ancient  exclusive  Spanish  claim  as  indisputable ;  but  that,  if  this 
was  denied,  all  the  other  just  claims  of  the  United  States  taken  to- 
gether constituted  a  complete  title,  or  at  least  far  superior  to  any 
that  could  be  adduced  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain. 

It  is  not  intended  to  enter  into  th•^  merits  of  the  question,  which 
has  been  completely  discussed,  since  the  object  of  this  paper  is  only 
to  show  that  there  remain  on  both  sides  certain  debatable  ques- 
tions J  and  that  therefore  both  Governments  may,  if  so  disposed. 


ifl 


1« 


Hi 


w 


^'1 


i 


recede  from  some  of  their  pretensions,  without  any  abandonment  of 
positive  rights,  and  without  impairing  national  honor  and  dignity. 

Although  Great  Britain  seems,  in  this  discussion,  to  have  relied 
almost  exclusively  on  the  right  derived  from  actual  occupancy  and 
settlement,  she  cannot  reject  absolutely  those  derived  from  other 
sources.     She  must  admit  that,  both  in  theory  and  practice,  the 
claims  derived  from  prior  discovery,  from  contiguity,  from  the  prin- 
ciple which  gives  to  the  first  discoverer  of  the  mouth  of  a  river  and 
of  its  course  a  claim  to  the  whole  country  drained  by  such  river, 
have  all  been  recognized  to  a  certain,  though  not  well-defined  ex- 
tent, by  all  the  European  nations  claiming  various  portions  of 
America.     And  she  cannot  deny  the  facts,  that  (as  Mr.  Greenhow 
justly  concludes)  the  seashore  had  been  generally  examined  from 
the  42d,  and  minutely  from  the  45th  to  the  48th  degree  of  latitude, 
Nootka  Sound  discovered,  and  the  general  direction  of  the  coast 
from  the  48th  to  the  58th  degree  of  latitude  ascertained,  by  the 
Spanish  expeditions,  in  the  years  1774  and  1775,  of  Perez,  Heceta, 
and  Bodego  y  Quadra  ;  that  the  American  Captain  Gray  was  the 
first  who,  in  1792,  entered  into  and  ascertained  the  existence  of  the 
River  Columbia,  and  the  place  where  it  empties  into  the  sea;  that, 
prior  to  that  discovery,  the  Spaniard  Heceta  was  the  first  who  had 
been  within  the  bay,  called  Deception  Bay  by  Meares,  into  which 
the  river  does  empty ;  that,  of  the  four  navigators  who  had  been  in 
that  bay  prior  to  Gray's  final  discovery,  the  Spaniard  Heceta  and 
the  American  Gray  were  the  only  ones  who  had  asserted  that  a 
great  river  emptied  itself  into  that  bay,  Heceta  having  even  given 
a  name  to  the  river  (St.  Roc),  and  the  entrance  having  been  desdg^ 
nated  by  his  own  name  (Ensennada  de  Heceta),  whilst  the. two 
English  navigators,  Meares  and  Vancouver,  had  both  concluded 
that  no  large  river  had  its  mouth  there  ;  that,  in  the  year  1805, 
Lewis  and  Clarke  were  the  first  who  descended  the  river  Columbia, 
from  one  of  its  principal  western  sources  to  its  mouth ;  that  the  first 
actual  occupancy  in  that  quarter  was  by  Mr.  Astor's  company,  on 
the  24th  of  March,  1811,  though  Mr.  Thompson,  the  astronomer 
of  the  British  Northwest  Company,  who  arrived  at  Astoria  on  the 
15th  of  July,  may  have  wintered  on  or  near  some  northern  source  of 
the  river  in  52  degrees  north  latitude ;  that  amongst  the  factories 


10 


established  by  that  American  company  one  was  situated  at  the  con- 
fluence of  the  Okanagan  with  the  Columbia,  in  about  49  degrees 
of  latitude  ;  that  the  42d  degree  is  the  boundary,  west  of  the  Stony 
Mountains,  established  by  treaty  between  Spain,  now  Mexico,  and 
the  United  States ;  that  the  49th  degree  is  likewise  the  boundary, 
from  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  to  the  IStony  Mountains,  established 
by  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States ;  and  that 
therefore  the  right  of  the  United  States,  which  may  be  derived  from 
the  principle  of  contiguity  or  continuity,  embraces  the  territory 
west  of  the  Stony  Mountains  contained  between  the  42d  and  49th 
degrees  of  latitude. 

Omitting  other  considerations  which  apply  principally  to  the  ter- 
litory  north  of  Fuca  Straits,  where  the  claims  of  both  parties  are 
almost  exclusively  derived  from  their  respective  discoveries,  in- 
cluding those  of  Spain,  it  may  be  rationally  inferred  from  the  pre- 
ceding enumeration  that  there  remain  various  questions  which 
must  be  considered  by  Great  Britain  as  being  still  doubtful  and  de- 
batable, and  that  she  may  therefore,  without  any  abandonment  of 
positive  rights,  recede  from  the  extreme  pretensions  which  she  has 
advanced  in  the  discussion  respecting  a  division  of  the  territory. 
But,  although  conjectures  may  be  formed,  and  the  course  pursued 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  may  have  an  influence  on 
that  which  Great  Britain  will  adopt,  it  does  not  belong  to  me  to 
discuss  what  that  Government  may  or  will  do.  This  paper  is  in- 
tended for  the  American,  and  not  for  the  English  public ;  and  my 
attention  has  been  principally  directed  to  those  points  which  may 
be  considered  by  the  United  States  as  doubtful  and  debatable. 

It  was  expressly  stipulated  that  nothing  contained  in  the  conven- 
tions of  1818  and  1827  should  be  construed  to  impair,  or  in  any 
manner  affect,  the  claims  which  either  of  the  contracting  parties 
may  have  to  any  part  of  the  country  westward  of  the  Stony  or 
Rocky  Mountains.  After  the  most  cool  and  impartial  investiga- 
tion of  which  I  am  capable,  I  have  not  been  able  to  perceive  any 
claim  on  the  pa-t  of  Great  Britain,  or  debatable  question,  respect- 
ing the  territory  south  of  Fuca's  Straits,  but  the  species  of  occu- 
pancy by  the  British  Fur  companies  between  the  year  1813  and 
October  20th,  1818 ;  and  this  must  be  considered  in  connection 


i.' 


::] 


m 


with  the  restoration  of  "  all  territory,  places,  and  possessions  what- 
soever, taken  by  either  party  from  the  other  during  the  war,"  pro- 
vided for  by  the  treaty  of  Ghent.  To  this  branch  of  the  subject 
belongs  also  the  question  whether  the  establishment  of  tra(hng  fac- 
tories with  Indians  may  eventually  give  a  right  to  sovereignty. 
My  opinion  was  expressed  in  the  American  counter-statement  of 
the  case,  dated  19th  December,  1826  :  "  It  is  believed  that  mere 
factories,  established  solely  for  the  purpose  of  trafficking  with  the 
natives,  and  without  any  view  to  cuUivation  and  permanent  settle- 
ment, cannot,  of  themselves,  and  unsupported  by  any  other  con- 
sideration, give  any  better  tiile  to  dominion  and  absolute  sovereign- 
ty than  similar  establishments  made  in  a  civilized  country."  How- 
ever true  this  may  be  as  an  abstract  proposition,  it  must  be  admit- 
ted that,  practically,  the  modest  British  factory  at  Calcutta  has 
gradually  grown  up  into  absolute  and  undisputed  sovereignty  over 
a  population  of  eighty  millions  of  people. 

The  questions  which,  as  it  appears  to  me,  may  be  allowed  by  the 
United  States  to  be  debatable,  and  therefore  to  make  it  questiona- 
ble whether  they  have  a  complete  right  to  the  whole  Oregon  ter- 
ritory, are : 

1st.  The  Nootka  convention,  which  applies  to  the  whole,  and 
which,  though  not  of  primary  importance,  is  nevertheless  a  fact, 
and  the  inferences  drawn  from  it  a  matter  of  argument. 

2dly.  The  discovery  of  the  Straits  of  Fuca. 

3dly.  North  of  those  straits ;  along  the  sea  shores,  the  discove- 
ries of  the  British  contrasted  with  those  of  the  American  and  Span- 
ish navigators  ;  in  the  interior,  the  question  whether  the  discovery 
of  the  mouth  and  the  navigation  of  one  of  its  principal  branches, 
from  its  source  to  the  mouth  of  the  river,  implies  without  exception 
a  complete  right  to  the  whole  country  drained  by  all  the  tributa- 
ries of  such  river  ;  and  also  the  British  claim  to  the  whole  terri- 
tory drained  by  Frazer's  river — its  sources  having  been  discovered 
in  1792  by  Sir  Alexander  Mackenzie,  factories  having  been  es- 
tablished upon  it  by  the  British  as  early  ^s  the  year  1806,  and  the 
whole  river  thence  to  its  mouth  having  been  for  a  number  of  years 
exclusively  navigated  by  British  subjects. 

It  appears  to  me  sufficient  generally  to  suggest  the  controverted 


21 


points.     That  which  relates  to  Fuca's  Sliaits  is  the  most  important, 
and  deserves  particular  ronsideralion. 

If  Fuca's  voyage  in  1592  could  be  i)roved  to  be  an  authentic 
document,  this  would  settle  at  once  the  (juestion  in  favor  of  the 
United  States ;  but  the  voyage  was  denietl  in  the  introduction  to 
the  voyage  of  the  Sutil  and  Mexicano.  This  was  an  oflicial  docu- 
ment, published  under  the  auspices  of  the  Spanish  Government, 
and  intended  to  vindicate  Spain  against  tlie  charges,  that  she  had 
contributed  nothing  to  the  advancement  of  geography  in  those 
quarters.  This  negative  evidence  was  confirmed  by  Humboldt, 
who  says  that  no  trace  of  such  voyage  can  be  found  in  the  archives 
of  Mexico.  Unwilling  to  adduce  any  doubtful  fact,  I  abstained 
from  alluding  to  it  in  the  statement  of  the  American  case  in  1826. 
Later  researches  show  that,  although  recorded  evidences  remain  of 
the  voyages  of  Gali  from  Macao  to  Acapulco  in  1584,  of  the  Santa 
Anna  (on  board  of  which  was,  as  he  says,  F'uca  himself)  from  Ma- 
nilla to  the  coast  of  California,  where  she  was  captured  in  1587 
by  Cavendish,  and  of  Vizcaino  in  1602-1G03,  and  even  of  Maldo- 
nado's  fictitious  voyage  in  1588,  yet  no  trace  has  been  found  in 
Spain  or  Mexico  of  Fuca's,  or  any  other  similar  voyage,  in  1C92, 
or  thereabout. 

On  reading  with  attention  the  brief  account  published  by  Pur- 
chas,  I  will  say  that  the  voyage  itself  has  much  internal  evidence 
of  its  truth,  but  that  the  inference  or  conclusion  throws  much  dis- 
credit on  the  whole.  The  only  known  account  of  the  voyage  is 
that  given  verbally  at  Venice  in  1596,  by  Fuca,  a  (ireek  pilot,  to 
Mr.  Lock,  a  respectable  English  merchant,  who  transmitted  it  to 
Purchas. 

Fuca  says  that  he  had  been  sent  by  the  Viceroy  of  Mexico  to 
discover  the  straits  of  Anian  and  the  passage  thereof  into  the  sea, 
which  they  called  the  North  Sea,  which  is  our  Morthwest  Sta  ; 
that  between  47  and  48  degrees  of  latitude  he  entered  into  a  broad 
inlet,  through  which  he  sailed  more  than  twenty  days ;  and,  being 
then  come  into  the  North  Sea  already,  and  not  being  sufficiently 
armed,  he  returned  again  to  Acapulco.  He  offered  then  to  Mr. 
Lock  to  go  into  England  and  serve  her  Majesty  in  a  voyage  for 
the  discovery  perfectly  of  the  Northwest  passage  into  the  South 


ii  ( 


22 


( i 


Sea.  If  it  be  granted  that  the  inlet  through  which  he  had  sailed 
was  really  the  same  as  the  straits  which  now  bear  his  name,  that 
sea  into  which  he  emerged,  and  which  he  asserts  to  be  our  JSTorth- 
west  SeUy  must  have  been  that  which  is  now  called  Queen  Char- 
lotte's Sound,  north  of  Quadra  and  Vancouver's  Island,  in  about 
51  degrees  of  latitude.  Our  JVbrthwest  Sea  was  that  which 
washes  the  shores  of  Newfoundland  and  Labrador,  then  univers- 
ally known  as  far  north  as  the  vicinity  of  the  60lh  degree  of  lati- 
tude. Hudson's  Straits  had  not  yet  been  discovered,  and  the  dis- 
covery of  Davis's  Straits  might  not  be  known  to  Fuca.  But  na 
navigator  at  that  time,  who,  like  he,  had  sailed  across  both  the  At- 
lantic and  the  Pacific  oceans,  could  be  ignorant  that  the  northern 
extremity  of  Newfoundland,  which  lies  nearly  in  the  same  latitude 
as  the  northern  entrance  of  Fuca's  Straits,  is  situated  sixty  or  seventy 
d^rees  of  longitude  east  of  that  entrance.  The  only  way  to  re- 
concile the  account  with  itself  is,  to  suppose  that  Fuca  believed 
that  the  continent  of  America  did  not,  on  the  side  of  the  Atlantic, 
extend  further  north  than  about  the  60th  degree,  and  was  bounded 
northwardly  by  an  open  sea,  which  extended  as  far  west  as  the 
northern  extremity  of  the  inlet  through  which  he  had  sailed.  It  is 
true  nevertheless  that,  between  the  years  1774  and  1792,  there 
was  i.  prevailing  opinion  amongst  the  navigators  that  Fuca  had 
actually  discovered  an  inlet  leading  towards  the  Atlantic.  Prior 
to  the  year  1787  they  were  engaged  in  seeking  for  it,  and  the 
Spaniards  had  for  that  purpose  explored  in  vain  the  sea  coast  lying 
south  of  the  48th  degree ;  for  it  is  well  known  that  Fuca's  en- 
trance lies  between  the  48th  and  49th,  and  not  between  the  47th 
and  48lh  degrees  of  latitude,  as  he  had  announced. 

The  modern  discovery  of  that  inlet  is  due  to  Captain  Barclay, 
an  Englishman,  commanding  the  Imperial  Eagle,  a  vessel  owned 
by  British  merchants,  but  which  was  equipped  at,  and  took  its  de- 
parture from  Ostend,  and  which  sailed  under  the  flag  of  the  Aus- 
trian East  India  Company.  The  British  Government,  which  has 
objected  to  the  American  claim  derived  from  Captain  Gray's  dis- 
covery of  the  mouth  of  the  river  Columbia,  on  the  ground  that  he 
was  a  private  individual,  and  that  his  vessel  was  not  a  public  ship, 
cannot  certainly  claim    anything  m  virt\?e  of  a  discovery  by  n 


23 


private  Englishman,  sailing  under  Austrian  colors.  In  that  case, 
and  rejecting  Fuca's  voyage,  neither  the  United  States  nor  Eng- 
land can  lay  any  claim  on  account  of  the  discovery  of  the  straits. 

Subsequently,  the  Englishman,  Meares,  sailing  under  the  Portu- 
guese flag,  penetrated,  in  1768,  about  ten  miles  into  the  inlet,  and 
the  American,  Gray,  in  1789,  about  fifty  miles.  The  pretended 
voyage  of  the  sloop  Washington  throughout  the  straits,  under  the 
command  of  either  Gray  or  Kendrick,  has  no  other  foundation  than 
an  assertion  of  Meares,  on  which  no  reliance  can  be  placed. 

In  the  year  1790  (1791  according  to  Vancouver)  the  Spaniards, 
Elisa  and  Quimper,  explored  the  straits  more  than  one  hundred 
miles,  discovering  the  Port  Discovery,  the  entrance  of  Admiralty 
Inlet,  the  Deception  Passage,  and  the  Canal  de  Haro.  In  1792 
Vancouver  explored  and  surveyed  the  straits  throughout,  together 
with  their  various  bays  and  harbors.  Even  there  he  had  been 
preceded  in  part  by  the  Sutil  and  Mexicano ;  and  he  expresses 
his  regret  that  they  had  advanced  before  him  as  far  as  the  Canal 
del  Rosario. 

Under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  cannot  be  doubted 
t£at  the  United  States  must  admit  that  the  discovery  of  the  straits, 
and  the  various  inferences  which  may  be  drawn  from  it,  are  doubt- 
ful and  debatable  questions. 

That  which  relates  to  a  presumed  agreement  of  Commissioners 
appointed  under  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  by  which  the  northern 
boundary  of  Canada  was,  from  a  certain  point  north  of  Lake  Su- 
perior, declared  to  extend  westwardly  along  the  49th  parallel  ot 
latitude,  does  not  appear  to  me  definitively  settled.  As  this  had 
been  assumed  many  years  before,  as  a  positive  fact,  and  had  never 
been  contradicted,  I  also  assumed  it  as  such  and  did  not  thoroughly 
investigate  the  subject.  Yet  I  had  before  me  at  least  one  map 
(name  of  publisher  not  recollected),  of  which  I  have  a  vivid  re- 
collection, on  which  the  dividing  lines  were  distinctly  marked  and 
expressly  designated,  as  being  in  conformity  with  the  agreement 
of  the  Commissioners  under  the  treaty  of  Utrecht.  The  evidence 
against  the  fact,  though  in  some  respects  strong,  is  purely  negative. 
The  line,  according  to  the  map,  extended  from  a  certain  point 
near  the  source  of  the  river  Saguenay,  in  a  westerly  direction,  to 


i\  I 


lit 


24 

another  designated  point  on  another  river  emptying  either  into  the 
St.  Lawrence  or  James's  Bay  ;  and  there  were,  in  that  way,  four 
or  five  lines  following  each  other,  all  tending  westwardly,  but  with 
different  inclinations  northwardly  or  southwardly,  and  all  extend- 
ing, from  some  apparently  known  point  on  a  designated  river,  to 
another  similar  point  on  another  river;  the  rivers  themselves 
emptying  themselves,  some  into  the  river  St.  Lawrence  and  others 
into  James's  Bay  or  Hudson's  Bay,  until,  from  a  certain  point 
lying  north  of  Lake  Superior,  the  line  was  declared  to  extend 
along  the  49th  degree  of  latitude,  as  above  stated.  It  was  with 
that  map  before  me  that  the  following  paragraph  was  inserted  in 
the  Ame-ican  statement  of  December,  1826 : 


!?    1, 


i  I 


"  The  limits  betwcon  the  possessions  of  Great  Britain  in  North  America, 
and  those  of  France  in  thc5  same  quarter,  namely,  Canada  and  Louisiana, 
were  determined  by  Commissioners  appointed  in  pursuance  of  the  treaty  of 
Utrecht.  From  the  coast  of  Labrador  to  a  certain  point  North  of  Lake 
Superior,  those  limits  were  fixed  according  to  certain  metes  and  bounds ; 
and  from  that  point  the  line  of  demarcation  was  agreed  to  extend  indefinitely 
due  west,  along  the  forty-ninth  parallel  of  north  latitude.  It  was  in  con- 
formity with  that  arrangement  that  the  United  States  did  claim  that  parallel 
as  the  northern  boundary  of  Louisiana.  It  has  been  ar  )rdingly  thus 
settled,  as  far  as  the  Stony  Mountains,  by  the  convention  oi  1818  between 
the  United  Statos  and  Great  Britain  ;  and  no  adequate  reason  can  be  given 
why  the  same  boundary  should'not  be  continued  as  far  as  the  claims  of  the 
United  States  do  extend,  that  is  to  say,  as  far  as  the  Pacific  ocean." 

It  appears  very  extraordinary  that  any  geographer  or  map-maker 
should  have  invented  a  dividing  line,  with  such  specific  details, 
without  having  sufficient  grour^ds  for  believing  that  it  had  been 
thus  determined  by  the  Commissioners  under  the  treaty  of  Utrecht. 
It  is  also  believed  that  Douglass'  Summary  (not  at  this  moment 
within  my  reach)  adverts  to  the  portion  of  the  line  from  the  coast 
of  Labrador  to  the  Saguenay.  Finally,  the  allusion  to  the  49th 
parallel,  as  a  boundary  fixed  in  consequence  of  the  treaty  of  Utrecht, 
had  been  repeatedly  made  in  the  course  of  preceding  negotiations, 
as  well  as  in  the  conferences  of  that  of  the  year  1826 ;  and  there 
is  no  apparent  motive,  if  the  assertion  was  known  by  the  British 
negotiators  not  to  be  founded  in  fact,  why  they  should  not  have 


■■ 


25 


at  once  denied  it.  It  may  be,  however,  that  the  question  having 
ceased  to  be  of  any  interest  to  Great  Britain  since  the  acquisition 
of  Canada,  they  had  not  investigated  the  subject.  It  is  of  some 
importance,  because,  if  authenticated,  the  discussion  would  be  con- 
verted from  questions  respecting  undefined  claims,  into  one  concern- 
ing the  construction  of  a  positive  treaty  or  convention. 

It  is  sufficiently  clear  that,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
case,  an  amicable  division  of  the  territory,  if  at  all  practicable,  must 
be  founded  in  a  great  degree  on  expedienrv.  This  of  course  must 
be  left  to  the  wisdom  of  the  two  Governments.  The  only  natural, 
equitable,  and  practicable  line  which  has  occurred  to  me,  is  one 
which,  running  through  the  middleofFuca  Straits,  from  its  entrance 
to  a  point  on  the  main,  situated  south  of  the  mouth  of  Frazer's  river, 
should  leave  to  the  United  States  all  the  shores  and  harbors  lying 
south,  and  to  Great  Britain  all  those  north  of  that  line,  including 
the  whole  of  Quadra  and  Vancouver's  Island.  It  would  be  through 
Fuca's  Straits  a  nearly  easterly  line,  along  the  parallel  of  about  481 
degrees,  leaving  to  England  the  most  valuable  and  permanent  por- 
tion of  the  fur  trade,  dividing  the  sea-coast  as  nearly  as  possible 
into  two  equal  parts,  and  the  ports  in  the  most  equitable  manner. 
To  leave  Admiralty  Inlet  and  its  Sounds  to  Great  Britain,  would 
give  her  a  possession  in  the  heart  of  the  American  portion  of  the 
territory.  Whether  from  the  point  where  the  line  would  strike  the 
main,  it  should  be  continued  along  the  same  parallel,  or  run  along 
the  49th,  is  a  matter  of  secondary  importance. 

If  such  division  should  take  place,  the  right  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  country  situated  on  the  upper  waters  of  the  Columbia  to  the 
navigation  of  that  river  to  its  mouth,  is  founded  on  natural  law ; 
and  the  principle  has  almost  been  recognized  as  the  public  law  of 
Europe.  Limited  to  commercial  purposes,  it  might  be  admitted, 
but  on  the  express  condition  that  the  citizens  of  the  United  States 
should  in  the  same  manner,  and  to  the  same  extent,  have  the  right 
to  navigate  the  river  St.  Lawrence. 

But  I  must  say  that,  whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  destinies  of 
the  Oregon  territory,  I  would  feel  great  regret  in  seeing  it  in  any  way 
divided.  An  amicable  division  appears  to  me  without  comparison 
preferable  to  a  war  for  that  object  between  the  two  countries.    In 


% 


every  other  view  of  the  subject  it  is  highly  exceptionable.  Without 
adverting  for  the  present  to  considerations  of  a  higher  nature,  it 
may  be  sufficient  here  to  observe,  that  the  conversion  of  the  north- 
ern part  of  the  territory  into  a  British  colony  would  in  its  effects 
make  the  arrangement  very  unequal.  The  United  States  are  for- 
bidden by  their  Constitution  to  give  a  preference  to  the  ports  of 
one  State  over  those  of  another.  The  ports  within  the  portion  of 
territory  allotted  to  the  United  Sta'  es  would  of  course  remain  open . 
to  British  vessels ;  whilst  American  vessels  would  be  excluded  from 
the  ports  of  the  British  colony,  unless  occasionally  admitted  by 
special  acts  depending  on  the  will  of  Greit  Britain. 


A\  ■'; 


>• 


i 


■VI 


bout 
e,  it 
trth- 
'ects 
for- 
s  of 
1  of 
ipen. 
rom 

by 


NUMBER  III. 


Beyond  the  naked  assertion  of  an  absolute  right  to  the  whole 
territory,  so  little  in  the  shape  of  argument  haa  been  adduced,  and 
so  much  warmth  has  been  exhibited  in  the  discussion  of  the  subject, 
that  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  question  has  now  become,  on 
both  sides,  one  of  feeling  rather  than  of  right.  This,  in  America, 
grows  out  of  the  fact  that,  in  this  contest  with  a  European  nation, 
the  contested  territory  is  in  America  and  not  in  Europe.  It  is  iden- 
tical with  the  premature  official  annunciation,  that  the  United  States 
could  not  acquiesce  in  the  establishment  of  any  new  colony  in 
North  America  by  any  European  nation.  This  sentiment  was  al- 
ready general  at  the  time  when  it  was  first  publicly  declared ;  and 
now  that  it  has  been  almost  universally  avowed,  there  can  be  no 
impropriety  in  any  private  citizen  to  say,  as  I  now  do,  that  I  share 
in  that  feeling  to  its  full  extent.  For  the  Americans,  Oregon  is  or 
will  be  home  :  for  England,  it  is  but  an  outpost,  which  may  afford 
means  of  annoyance,  rather  than  be  a  source  of  real  power.  In 
America  all  have  the  san:e  ultimate  object  in  view  ;  we  differ  only  • 
with  respect  to  the  means  hy  which  it  may  be  attained. 

Two  circumstances  have  had  a  tendency  to  nourish  and  excite 
these  feelings.  The  British  fur  companies,  from  their  position, 
from  their  monopolizing  character,  from  their  natural  influence 
upon  the  Indians,  and  from  that,  much  greater  than  might  have 
been  expected,  which  they  have  constantly  had  upon  the  British 
Government  in  its  negotiations  with  the  United  States,  have  for 
sixty  years  been  a  perpetual  source  of  annoyance  and  collisions. 
The  vested  interests  of  the  Hudson  Bay  Company  are  at  this  mo- 


[■  "i 


r 


ment  the  greatest  obstacle  to  an  amicable  arrangement.  It  is  at 
the  same  time  due  to  justice  to  say  that,  as  far  as  is  known,  that 
company  has  acted  in  Oregon  in  conformity  with  the  terms  of  the 
convention,  and  that  its  officers  have  uniformly  treated  the  Ameri- 
cans, whether  visitors  or  emigrants,  not  only  courteously,  but  with 
great  kindness. 

If  the  British  colonies  on  the  continent  of  America  were  an  in- 
dependent country,  or  were  they  placed  in  their  commercial  rela- 
tions, at  least  with  the  United  States,  on  the  same  footing  as  the 
British  possessions  in  Europe,  these  relations  would  be  regulated 
by  the  reciprocal  interests  and  wants  of  the  parties  immediately 
concerned.  Great  Britain  has  an  undoubted  right  to  persist  in  her 
colonial  policy ;  but  the  result  has  been  extremely  vexatious,  and 
to  the  United  States  injurious.  All  this  is  true.  But  feelings  do 
not  confer  a  right,  and  the  indulgence  of  excited  feelings  is  neither 
virtue  nor  wisdom. 

The  Western  States  have  no  greater  apparent  immediate  interest 
in  the  acquisition  of  Oregon  than  the  States  bordering  on  the  At- 
lantic. These  stand  in  greater  need  of  an  outlet  for  their  surplus 
emigrating  population,  and  to  them  exclusively,  will  for  the  present, 
the  benefit  accrue  of  ports  on  the  Pacific,  for  the  protection  of  the 
numerous  American  ships  employed  in  the  fisheries  and  commerce 
of  that  ocean.  It  is  true  that  in  case  of  war  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Western  States  will  not,  if  a  naval  superiority  shall  be  obtained  on 
the  Upper  Lakes,  feel  those  immediate  calamities  of  war  to  which 
the  country  along  the  seashore  is  necessarily  exposed ;  but  no  sec- 
tion of  the  United  States  will  be  more  deeply  affected,  by  the  im- 
possibility of  finding  during  the  war  a  market  for  the  immense  sur- 
plus of  its  agricultural  products.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that 
a  direct  tax  has  heretofore  been  found  as  productive  as  the  ag- 
gregate of  all  the  other  internal  taxes  levied  by  the  General  Gov- 
ernment ;  that,  in  case  of  war,  it  must  necessarily  be  imposed ;  and 
that,  as  it  must,  in  conformity  with  the  Constitution,  be  levied  in 
proportion  to  the  respective  population  of  the  several  States,  it  will 
be  much  more  oppressive  on  those  which  have  not  yet  accumulated 
a  large  amount  of  circulating  or  personal  capital.  The  greater 
degree  of  excitement  which  prevails  in  the  West  is  due  to  other 
and  more  powerful  causes  than  a  regard  for  self-interest. 


KS 


Bordering  through  the  whole  of  their  northern  frontier  on  the 
British  possessions,  the  Western  people  have  always  been  person- 
ally exposed  to  the  annoyances  and  collisions  already  alluded  to  ; 
and  it  may  be  that  the  hope  of  getting  rid  of  these  by  the  conquest 
of  Canada  has  some  influence  upon  their  conduct.  Independent  of 
this,  the  indomitable  energy  of  this  nation  has  been  and  is  nowhere 
displayed  so  forcibly  as  in  the  new  States  and  settlements.  It  was 
necessarily  directed  towards  the  acquisition  of  land  and  the  cultiva- 
tion of  the  soil.  In  that  respect  it  has  performed  prodigies.  Three 
millions  of  cultivators  of  the  soil  are  now  found  between  the  Lakes 
and  the  Ohio,  where,  little  more  than  fifty  years  before,  save  only 
three  or  ibur  half  Indian  French  settlements,  there  was  not  a  single 
white  inhabitant.  Nothing  now  seems  impossible  to  those  men  ; 
they  have  not  even  been  sobered  by  fresh  experience.  Attempting 
to  do  at  once,  and  without  an  adequate  capital,  that  which  should 
have  been  delayed  five-and-twenty  years,  and  might  have  then 
been  successfully  accomplished,  some  of  those  States  have  had  the 
mortification  to  find  themselves  unable  to  pay  the  interest  on  the 
debt  they  had  contracted,  and  obliged  to  try  to  compound  with 
their  creditors.  Nevertheless,  undiminished  activity  and  locomo- 
tion are  still  the  ruling  principles  :  the  Western  people  leap  over 
time  and  distance ;  ahead  they  must  go ;  it  is  their  mission.  May 
God  speed  them,  and  may  they  thus  quietly  take  possession  of  the 
entire  contested  territory ! 

All  this  was  as  well  known  to  the  British  Government  as  to 
ourselves.  A  public  and  official  declaration  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States  was  unnecessary  and  at  least  premature.  Mr. 
Rush's  correspondence  of  1824  bears  witness  of  its  unfortunate 
effect  on  the  negotiations  of  that  year.  These  feelings  had  gradu- 
ally subsided.  But,  whatever  may  be  the  cause,  the  fact  that  an 
extraordinary  excitement  on  this  subject  has  manifested  itself, 
and  does  now  exist  on  both  sides,  cannot  be  denied.  Time  is 
absolutely  necessary  in  order  that  this  should  subside.  Any  pre- 
cipitate step  now  taken  by  either  Government  would  be  attended 
with  the  most  fatal  consequences.  That  which,  if  done  some  years 
ago,  might  have  been  harmless,  would  now  be  highly  dangerous, 
and  should  at  least  be  postponed  for  the  present. 


I,  Ml 


30 


!l      -1 


Ii:1 


I    i 


The  first  incipient  step  recommended  by  the  Executive  is,  to 
give  the  notice  that  the  convention  of  1827  shall  expire  at  the  end 
of  one  year.  This  measure  at  this  time,  and  connected  with  the 
avowed  intention  of  assuming  exclusive  sovereignty  over  the  whole 
territory,  becomes  a  question  of  peace  or  war. 

The  conventions  of  18 18  and  1827,  whilst  reserving  the  rights 
of  both  parties,  allowed  the  freedom  of  trade  and  navigation 
throiighout  the  whole  territory  to  remain  common  to  both;  and  the 
citizens  or  subjects  of  both  powers  were  permitted  to  occupy  any 
part  of  it.  The  inconveniences  of  that  temporary  arrangement 
were  well  understood  at  the  time.  The  British  fur  companies  had 
established  factories  on  the  banks,  and  even  south  of  the  river  Co- 
lumbia, within  the  limits  of  that  portion  of  the  country  which  the 
United  States  had,  whenever  the  subject  was  discussed,  claimed  as 
belonging  exclusively  to  them.  The  conditions  of  the  agreement 
were  nominally  reciprocal ;  but,  though  they  did  not  give,  yet  they 
did  in  fact  leave  the  British  company  in  the  exclusive  possession  of 
the  fur  trade.  This  could  not  be  prevented  otherwise  than  by 
resorting  to  actual  force :  the  United  States  were  not  then  either 
ready  or  disposed  to  run  the  risks  of  a  war  for  that  object ;  and  it 
was  thought  more  eligible,  that  the  British  traders  should  remain  on 
the  territory  of  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  a  compact  and  with 
their  consent,  than  in  defiance  of  their  authority.  It  is  but  very 
lately  that  the  Americans  have  begun  to  migrate  to  that  remote 
country  :  a  greater  number  will  certainly  follow ;  and  they  have 
under  the  convention  a  perfect  right  to  occupy  and  make  settle- 
ments in  any  part  of  the  territory  they  may  think  proper,  with 
the  sole  exception  of  the  spots  actually  occupied  by  the  British 
company. 

What  is  then  the  object  in  view,  in  giving  the  notice  at  this  time  ? 
This  has  been  declared  without  reserve  by  the  President :  "  At 
the  end  of  the  year's  notice,  should  Congress  think  it  proper  to 
make  provision  for  giving  that  notice,  we  shall  have  reached  a 
period  when  the  national  rights  in  Oregon  must  either  be  aban- 
doned or  firmly  maintained.  That  they  cannot  be  abandoned  with- 
out a  sacrifice  of  both  national  honor  and  interests,  is  too  clear  to 
admit  of  doubt."     And  it  must  be  recollected  that  this  candid  avowal 


I 


31 


has  been  accompanied  by  the  declaration  that  "  our  title  to  the 
whole  Oregon  territory  had  been  asserted  and,  as  was  believed, 
maintained  by  irrefragable  facts  and  arguments."  Nothing  can 
be  more  plain  and  explicit.  The  exclusive  right  of  the  United 
States  to  absolute  sovereignty  over  the  whole  territory  must  be 
asserted  and  maintained. 

It  may  not  be  necessary  for  that  purpose  to  drive  away  the 
British  fur  company,  nor  to  prevent  the  migration  into  Oregon  of 
British  emigrants  coming  from  the  British  dominions.  The  com- 
pany may,  if  deemed  expedient,  be  permitted  to  trade  as  heretofore 
with  the  Indians.  British  emigrants  may  be  treated  in  the  same 
manner  as  the  other  sixty  or  eighty  thousand  who  already  arrive 
yearly  in  the  United  States.  They  may  at  their  option  be  natural- 
ised, or  remain  on  the  same  footing  as  foreigners  in  other  parts  of 
the  Union.  In  this  case  they  will  enjoy  no  political  rights  ;  they 
will  not  be  permitted  to  own  American  vessels  and  to  sail  under 
the  American  flag  ;  the  permission  to  own  real  property  seems,  so 
long  as  Oregon  remains  a  territory,  to  depend  on  the  will  of  Con- 
gress.    Thus  far  collision  may  be  avoided. 

But  no  foreign  jurisdiction  can  be  permitted,  from  the  moment 
when  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States  over  the  whole  terri- 
tory shall  be  asserted  and  maintained.  To  this,  all  those  who 
reside  in  the  territory  must  submit.  After  having  taken  the  deci- 
sive step  of  giving  the  notice,  the  United  States  cannot,  as  the 
President  justly  states,  abandon  the  right  of  sovereignty  without  a 
sacrifice  of  national  honor. 

It  had  been  expressly  agreed  by  the  convention  that  nothing 
contained  in  it  should  affect  the  claims  of  either  party  to  the  terri- 
tory. The  all-important  question  of  sovereignty  remained  there- 
fore in  abeyance.  Negotiations  for  a  division  of  the  territory  have 
failed  :  the  question  of  sovereignty  remains  undecided,  as  it  was 
prior  to  the  convention.  If  the  United  Sat  es  exercise  the  reserved 
right  to  put  an  end  to  the  convention,  and  if,  from  the  time  when 
it  shall  have  expired,  they  peremptorily  assume  the  right  of  sove- 
reignty over  the  whole,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  Great  Britain 
will  at  once  resist.  She  will  adhere  to  the  principle  she  had 
asserted  prior  to  the  Nootka  convention,  and  has  ever  since  main- 


-   i 


38 

tained,  that  actual  occupancy  can  alone  give  a  right  to  the  country. 
She  will  not  permit  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States*  to  be 
extended  over  her  subjects  :  she  will  oppose  the  removal,  arrest, 
or  exercise  of  any  other  legal  process,  against  her  justices  of  the 
peace,  against  any  other  officerswho  directly  or  indirectly  Jict  under 
her  authority,  against  any  of  her  subjects ;  and  she  will  continue 
to  exercise  her  jurisdiction  over  all  of  them  throughout  the  whole 
territory.  Whatever  either  Power  asserts  must  be  maintained : 
military  occupation  and  war  must  necessarily  ensue. 

A  portion  of  the  people,  both  in  the  West  and  elsewhere,  see 
clearly  that  such  must  be  the  consequence  of  giving  the  notice. 
Such  men  openly  avow  their  opinions,  prefer  war  to  a  longer  con- 
tinuation of  the  present  state  of  things,  are  ready  to  meet  all  the 
dangers  and  calamities  of  the  impending  conflict,  and  to  adopt  at 
once  all  the  measures  which  may  ensure  success.  With  them,  the 
discussion  brings  at  once  the  question  to  its  true  issue  :  Is  war  ne- 
ces'-ary  for  the  object  they  have  in  view  1  Or  may  it  not  be  at- 
tained by  peaceable  means  ?  It  is  a  question  of  war  or  peace,  and 
it  is  fairly  laid  before  the  nation. 

But  many  respectable  men  appear  to  entertain  hopes  that  peace 
may  still  be  preserved  after  the  United  States  shall  have  assumed, 
or  attempted  to  assume,  exclusive  sovereignty.  The  reverse  ap- 
pears to  me  so  clear,  so  obvious,  so  inevitable,  that  I  really  cannot 
understand  on  what  grounds  these  hopes  are  founded. 

Is  it  thought  that  the  President  will  not,  after  the  assent  of  Con- 
gress has  been  obtained  (and  whether  immediately  or  at  the  end  of 
this  session,  is  quite  immaterial),  give  the  notice  which  he  has 
asked  Congress  to  authorize  1  Or  is  it  supposed  that  a  change  in 
the  form  which,  in  order  to  avoid  responsibility,  would  give  him  a 
discretionary  power,  could  lead  to  a  different  result,  or  be  anything 
else  but  a  transfer  by  Congress  to  the  Executive  of  the  power  to 
declare  war  1 

Can  it  be  presumed  that  when,  after  the  expiration  of  the  term 
of  notice,  the  convention  shall  have  been  abrogated,  the  President 
will  not  assert  and  maintain  the  sovereignty  claimed  by  the  United 
States  ?  I  have  not  the  honor  of  a  personal  acquaintance  with 
him ;  I  respect  in  him  the  First  Magistrate  of  the  Nation ;  and  he 


,u, 


to 


!d 


is  universally  represented  as  of  irreproachable  character,  sincere, 
and  patriotic.  Every  citizen  has  a  right  to  differ  with  him  in  opi- 
nion :  no  one  has  that  of  supposing  that  he  ^ays  one  thing  and 
means  another.  I  feel  an  intimate  conviction  of  his  entire  sin- 
cerity. 

Is  it  possible  that  any  one,  who  does  not  labor  under  a  sintjular 
illusion,  can  believe  that  England  will  yield  to  threats  and  defiance 
that  which  she  has  refused  to  concede  to  our  arguments  ?  Reverse 
the  case  :  Suppose  for  a  moment  that  Great  Britain  was  the  ag- 
gressor, and  had  given  the  notice ;  declaring,  at  the  same  time, 
that,  at  the  expiration  of  the  year,  she  would  assume  exclusive 
sovereignty  over  the  whole  country,  and  oppose  the  exercise  of  any 
whatever  by  the  United  States :  is  there  any  American,  even 
amongst  those  who  set  the  least  value  on  the  Oregon  territory,  and 
are  most  sincerely  desirous  of  preserving  peace,  who  would  not  at 
once  declare  that  such  pretension  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  was 
outrageous  and  must  be  resisted  ? 

It  is  not  certainly  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  to  wage  war 
against  the  United  States,  and  it  may  be  fairly  presumed  that  the 
British  Government  has  no  such  wish.     But  England  is,  as  well 
as  the  United  States,  a  great,  powerful,  sensitive,  and  proud  nation. 
Every  effusion  of  the  British  press  which  displays  hostility  to  the 
United  States,  produces  an  analogous  sentiment,  and  adds  new 
fuel  to  excitement  in  America.     A  moment's  reflection  will  enable 
us  to  judge  of  the  inevitable  effect  of  an  offensive  and  threatening 
act,  emanating  from  our  Government;  an  act  which  throws,  in  the 
face  of  the  world,  the  gauntlet  of  defiance  to  Great  Britain.     Her 
claims  and  views,  as  laid  down  in  her  statement  of  December,  1826, 
remos'e  every  doubt  respecting  the  steps  she  will  take.     "  Great 
Britain  claims  no  exclusive  sovereignty  over  any  portion  of  that 
territory.     Her  present  claim,  not  in  respect  to  any  part,  but  to  the 
whole,  is  limited  to  a  right  of  joint  occupancy  in  common  with 
other  States,  leaving  the  right  of  exclusive  dominion  in  abeyance. 
*    *     *    *     ']?jjg  pretensions  of  Great  Britain  tend  to  the  mere 
maintenance  of  her  own  rights,  in  resistance  to  the  exclusive  cha- 
racter of  the  pretensions  of  the  United  States.    *    *    *    *    These 
rights  embrace  the  right  to  navigate  the  waters  of  those  countries, 


y' 


J 


Hi 


the  righf  to  settle  in  and  over  any  part  of  them,  and  the  right  freely 
to  trade  with  the  inhabitanls  and  occupiers  of  the  same.  It  is  fully 
admit  led  that  the  United  States  possess  the  same  rights.  But  be- 
yond these  rights,  they  possess  none.  To  the  interests  and  es- 
tablishments wliich  British  industry  and  enterprise  have  created 
Great  Britain  owes  protection.  That  protection  will  he  given, 
both  as  regards  settlement  and  freedom  of  trade  and  navigation, 
with  every  attention  not  to  infringe  the  co-ordinate  rights  of  the 
United  States." 

Thus,  the  United  States  declare  that  they  give  notice  of  the  ab- 
rogation of  the  convention,  with  the  avowed  determination  of  as- 
serting their  assumed  right  of  absolute  and  exclusive  sovereignty 
over  the  whole  territory  of  Oregon.  And  Great  Britain  has  expli- 
citly declared  that  her  pretensions  were,  in  resistance  to  the  exclu- 
sive character  of  those  of  the  United  States  ;  and  that  protection 
will  be  given  both  as  regards  settlement  and  freedom  of  trade  and 
navigation  to  the  interests  and  establishments  which  British  indus- 
try and  enterprise  have  created. 

How  war  can  be  avoided,  if  both  Powers  persist  in  their  con- 
flicting determinations,  is  incomprehensible.  Undei  such  circum- 
stances negotiation  is  morally  impossible  during  the  year  following 
the  notice.  To  give  that  notice,  with  the  avowed  determination 
to  assume  exclusive  sovereignty  at  the  end  of  the  year,  is  a  deci- 
sive, most  probably  an  irretrievable,  step.  "  After  that  period  the 
United  States  cannot  abandon  their  right  of  sovereignty  without  a 
sacrifice  of  national  honor." 

The  question  of  sovereignty  has  hbver  been  decided.  Simply 
to  give  notice  of  the  abrogation  of  the  convention,  would  leave  the 
question  in  the  same  situation :  it  would  remain  in  abeyance.  But 
when  the  President  has  recommended  that  the  notice  should  be 
given  with  the  avowed  object  of  assuming  exclusive  sovereignty, 
an  Act  of  Congress,  in  compliance  with  his  recommendation,  ne- 
cessarily implies  an  approbation  of  the  object  for  which  it  is  given. 
If  the  notice  should  be  given,  the  only  w  ay  to  avoid  that  implica- 
tion and  its  fatal  consequences,  is  to  insert  in  it,  an  explicit  decla- 
ration, that  the  sovereignty  shall  not  be  assumed.  But  then  why 
give  the  notice  at  all  ?     A  postponement  is  far  preferable,  unless 


35 


some  other  advantage  shall  be  obtained  by  the  abrogation  of  the 
convcntif)n.  This  must  be  examined,  and  it  is  necessary  to  inquire 
whether  any  and  what  ineasui<'s  may  be  adopted,  without  any  vio- 
hitionof  the  convention,  that  will  preserve  the  rights  and  strengthen 
the  position  of  the  United  States. 


1 1 


-'11 


i 


NUMBER    IV. 


^1 


j; 


li' 


The  acts  which  the  government  of  the  United  States  may  do, 
in  conformity  with  the  convention,  embrace  two  objects :  the 
measures  applicable  to  the  territory  within  their  acknowledged 
limits  which  may  facilitate  and  promote  migration ;  and  those 
which  are  necessary  for  the  protection  of  their  citizens  residing  in 
the  Oregon  territory. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that,  although  the  convention  has  now 
been  in  force  twenty-seven  years.  Congress  has  actually  done 
nothing  with  respect  to  either  of  those  objects.  Enterprising 
individuals  have,  without  any  aid  or  encouragement  by  Govern- 
mer*,  opened  a  wagon-road  eighteen  hundred  miles  in  length, 
through  an  arid  or  mountainous  region,  and  made  settlements  on 
or  near  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  without  any  guaranty  for  the 
possession  of  the  land  improved  by  their  iubors.  Even  the  attempt 
to  carry  on  an  inland  trade  with  the  Indians  of  Oregon  has  been 
defented,  by  the  refusal  to  allow  a  drawback  of  the  high  duties 
imposed  on  the  importation  of  foreign  goods  absolutely  necessary 
for  that  commerce.  Thus  the  fur  trade  has  remained  engro~3ed  by 
the  Hudson  Bay  Company ;  missionaries  were,  till  very  lately, 
almost  the  only  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  be  found  in  Oregon; 
the  United  States,  during  the  whole  of  that  period,  have  derived 
no  other  advantage  from  the  convention  than  the  reservation  of 
their  rights,  and  the  express  provision  that  these  should  in  no  way 
be  affected  by  the  continuance  of  the  British  factories  in  the  terri- 
tory. And,  now  that  the  tide  of  migration  has  turned  in  their 
favor,  they  are  suddenly  invited  to  assume  a  hostile  position,  to 


87 


endure  the  calamities  and  to  run  the  chances  and  consequences  of 
war,  in  order  to  gain  an  object  which  natural  and  i-.-caistible 
causes,  if  permitted  to  operate,  cannot  fail  ultimately  to  attain. 

The  measures  applicable  to  the  territory  within  the  acknowledged 
limits  of  the  U.  States  have  generally  been  recommended  by  the  Pre- 
sident. Avery  xioderate  appropriation  will  be  sufficient  to  improve 
the  most  difficult  portions  of  the  road:  and  block-houses  or  other  tem- 
porary works,  erected  in  proper  places  and  at  convenient  distances, 
and  garrisoned  by  a  portion  of  the  intended  additional  force,  will  pro- 
tect and  facilitate  the  progress  of  the  emigrants.  However  unin- 
viting may  be  the  vast  extent  of  prairies,  destitute  of  timber, 
which  intervene  between  the  western  boundary  of  the  State  of 
Missouri  and  the  country  bordering  on  the  Stony  Mountains,  it 
seems  impossible  that  there  should  not  be  found  come  more  favored 
spots  where  settlements  may  be  formed.  If  these  were  selected 
for  military  posts,  and  donations  of  land  were  made  to  actual  set- 
tlers in  their  vicinity,  a  series  of  villages,  though  probably  not  a 
continuity  of  settlements,  would  soon  arise  through  the  whole 
length  of  the  road.  The  most  important  place,  that  which  is  most 
wanted,  either  as  a  place  of  rest  for  the  emigrants,  or  for  mi'Hary 
purposes,  is  one  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  Stony  Mourdains. 
Reports  speak  favorably  of  the  fertility  of  the  soil  in  some  of  the 
valleys  of  the  upper  waters,  within  our  limits — of  Bear's  river,  of 
the  Rio  Colorado,  and  of  some  of  the  northern  branches  of  the 
river  Platte.  There,  also,  the  seat  of  justice  might  be  placed  of 
the  new  territory,  whose  cc'-fs  should  have  su^)erior  jurisdiction 
over  Oregon. 

The  measures  which  the  United  States  have  a  right  to  carry 
into  effect  within  the  territory  of  Oregon  must  now  be  considered. 

The  only  positive  condition  of  the  convention  is,  that  the  territo- 
ry in  quesl'on  shall,  together  with  its  harbors,  bays,  and  creeks, 
and  the  navigation  of  all  rivers  within  the  same,  be  fiee  and  open 
to  vessels,  citizens,  and  subjects  of  the  two  Powers. 

For  the  construction  put  on  this  article  by  Great  Britain,  it  is 
necessary  to  recur  again  to  the  statement  of  her  claim,  as  given 
by  herself,  and  to  her  own  acts  subsequent  to  the  convention. 

The  acts  of  England,  subsequent  to  the  convention  of  1818,  are 


I 


38 


to  be  found  in  the  various  charters  of  the  Hudson  Bay  Company 
(observing  that  seme  of  their  most  important  provisions,  though 
of  a  much  earlier  date,  stand  unrepealed),  and  in  the  act  of  Parlia- 
ment of  the  year  1821,  which  confirms  and  extends  a  prior  one  of 
the  year  1803.  It  must  also  be  recollected  that,  by  grants  or  acts 
subsequent  to  the  convention,  the  ancient  Hudson  Bay  Company 
and  the  Northwest  Company  of  Montreal  have  been  united  together, 
preserving  the  name  of  Hudson  Bay  Company.  >     • 

This  Company  was  and  remains  a  body  corporate  and  politic, 
with  provisions  for  the  election  of  a  Governor  and  other  officers, 
who  direct  its  business  ;  and  amongst  other  powers,  the  Company 
is  empowered  to  build  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  its  posses- 
sions, as  well  as  to  make  wra-  or  pea':e  with  all  nations  or  people, 
not  Christian,  inhabiting  their  territories,  which  now  embrace  the 
entire  Oregon.  By  the  act  of  Pailiament  of  1821,  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  courts  of  Upper  Canada  is  extended,  in  all  civil  and  criminal 
cases,  to  the  Oregon  territory ;  provision  is  made  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  justices  of  the  peace  within  the  said  territory,  with  a  limit- 
ed jurisdiction,  and  power  to  act  as  Commissioners  in  certain  cases, 
and  to  convey  offenders  to  Upper  Canada. 

It  must  also  be  observed  that,  although  the  Company  is  for- 
bidden to  claim  any  exclusive  trade  with  the  Indians,  to  the  preju- 
dice or  exclusion  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  who  may  be 
engaged  in  the  same  trade,  yet  the  jurisdiction  above  mentioned  is, 
by  the  letter  of  the  act,  extended  to  any  persons  whatsoever  re- 
siding or  being  within  the  said  territory.  The  British  Plenipo- 
tentiarips  did,  however,  explicitly  declare,  in  the  course  of^he  ne- 
gotiations of  1826-1827,  thnt  the  act  had  no  other  object  but  the 
maintenance  of  order  amongst  British  subjects,  and  had  never  been 
intended  to  apply  to  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

It  is  perfectly  clear  that,  since  it  has  been  fully  admitted  that  the 
United  States  possess  the  same  rights  over  the  territory  as  Great 
Britain,  they  are  fully  authorized,  under  the  convention,  to  enjoy 
all  the  rights  which  Great  Britain  claims  for  herself,  and  to  exer- 
cise that  jurisdiction  which  she  has  assumed  as  being  consistent 
with  the  convention. 

The  citizens  of  the  United  Siates  have,  the.eforr  v>t  thJ-  time  a 


ft 


i 


r 


full  and  acknowledged  right  to  navigate  the  waters  of  the  Oregon 
territory,  to  settle  in  and  over  any  part  of  it,  and  freely  to  trade 
with  the  inhabitants  and  occupiers  of  the  same.  And  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  is  likewise  fully  authorized  to  incor- 
porate any  company  or  association  of  men  for  the  purpose  of 
trading  or  of  ocv^jpying  and  settling  the  country  ;  to  extend  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  any  of  its  territories  lying  within  its 
acknowledged  limits,  in  all  civil  and  criminal  cases,  to  the  terri- 
tory aforesaid  ;  to  appoint  within  the  same  justices  of  the  peace 
and  such  other  officers  as  may  be  necessary  for  carrying  the 
jurisdiction  into  effect ;  and  also  to  make  war  and  peace  with  the 
Indian  inhabitants  of  the  territory,  including  the  incidental  power 
to  appoint  agents  for  that  purpose. 

^  On  the  other  hand,  it  sejms  to  be  understood  that,  so  long  as 
the  convention  remain",  in  force,  neither  Government  shall  lay 
duties  in  the  Territory  on  tonnage,  merchandise,  or  commerce  ; 
nor  exercise  exclusive  juiisdiction  over  any  portion  of  ii;  and  that 
the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the  two  Powers,  residing  in  or  re- 
moving to  the  territory,  shall  be  amenable  only  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  their  own  country  respectively. 

It  has  been  contended  by  the  British  Government  that  the 
establishment  of  any  military  post,  or  the  introduction  of  any  re- 
gular force  under  a  national  flag,  by  either  Power,  would  be  an  act 
of  exclusive  sovereignty,  which  could  not  be  permitted  to  either 
whilst  the  sovereigr.ty  remained  in  abeyance.  Under  existing 
«,  ircumstances,  it  is  bellevrd  that  such  an  act  would  be  highly 

'angerous,  and  prove  unfavorable  to  the  United  States. 

But  the  establishn^ent  by  the  United  States  of  a  Territorial  Go- 
vernment over  Oregon  is  also  objected  to  on  the  same  principle. 
The  want  of  such  government  appears  to  be  the  only  serious  in- 
con\enience  attending  a  continuance  of  the  convention,  and  re- 
quires special  consideration. 

The  United  States  have  the  same  right  as  Great  Britain,  and 
are  equally  bound,  to  protect  their  citizens  residing  in  the  Oregon 
territory,  in  the  exercise  of  all  the  ri^jhts  secured  to  them  by  the 
convention.  It  has  lieen  fully  admitted  that  these  rights  embrace  the 
right  to  settle  in  and  over  any  part  of  the  territory,  and  that  they 


i 


40 


m 


are  to  be,  in  all  cases  whatever,  amenable  only  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  their  own  country.  The  subjects  of  Great  Britain,  who  are  not 
in  the  employ  of  the  Hudson  Bay  Company,  are  forbidden  to  trade 
with  the  natives ;  and  the  company  does  in  fact  control  and 
govern  all  the  British  subjects  residing  in  the  territory.  This 
gives  a  strong  guaranty  against  the  violation,  by  rash  individuals, 
of  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Should  any  of 
them,  however,  be  disturbed  in  the  exercise  of  their  legitimate 
rights,  and  the  company  should  be  unable  or  unwilling  to  relieve 
and  indemnify  them,  the  United  States  would  be  justly  entitled  to 
appeal  to  the  British  Government  for  the  redress  of  a  violation  of 
rights  secured  by  i  ■  ■''  ontion  ;  for  the  British  Government  has 
preserved  a  control  *_  ihe  Hudson  Bay  Company,  and  does  in 
fact,  through  it,  govern  uie  British  subjects  who  reside  in  the  ter- 
ritory. 

The  United  States  are  placed,  in  that  respect,  in  a  very  different 
situation.  It  is  not  believed  that  the  General  Government  is 
authorized  to  incorporate,  as  a  political  body,  a  commercial  com- 
pany, with  such  powers  as  would  give  it  an  efficient  control  over 
the  private  cit'zeiis  residing  in  ihe  territory.  Such  delegation  of 
powers,  either  by  any  of  the  Stales  or  by  Congress,  is  wholly 
inconsistent  with  our  institutions.  The  United  States  may  indeed 
give  to  their  c'iizens  in  Oregon  a  regular  and  "complete  judiciary 
system;  and  they  may  also  extend  to  them,  as  the  British  Govern- 
ment has  done  on  its  part,  the  laws  of  an  adjacent  territory.  But 
an  executive  local  power  is  wanted  in  this  case,  as  it  is  every- 
where else,  under  any  form  of  government  whatever,  to  cause 
the  laws  to  be  executed,  and  to  have  that  general  control 
which  is  now  exercised,  through  the  Hudson  Bay  Company,  by 
the  British  Government.  There  are,  besides,  v  arious  acts  of  a 
])ublic  though  local  nature,  such  as  opening  roads,  making  bridges, 
erecting  block-houses  for  protection  against  the  natives,  providing 
for  the  destitute,  &c.,  all  which  are  performed  by  the  Hudson  Bay 
Company,  and  cannot  be  accomplished  by  insulated  individuals, 
bound  by  no  legal  association  or  government. 

Whether  any  measures  may  be  devised,  other  than  a  territorial 
government,  that  will   be   sufficient  for   the  purpose  intended; 


41 


whether  all  the  American  citizens  residing  in  Oregon  raight  not 
be  incorporated  and  made  a  body  politic,  with  powers  equivalent 
to  those  vested  in  the  Hudson  Bay  Company,  and  with  the  reserva- 
tion by  the  General  Government  of  a  check  or  control  analogous 
to  that  reserved  by  the  Government  of  Great  Britain,  are  questions 
worthy  of  serious  consideration.  But  Great  Britain  has  the  same 
interest  as  the  United  States  to  prevent  collision  during  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  convention  ;  and  it  is  believed  that,  if  negotiations 
should  be  renewed,  with  an  equal  and  sincere  desire  on  both  sides 
to  preserve  friendly  relations,  there  would  be  no  difficulty  at  this 
time  in  coming  to  an  understanding  on  the  subject.  It  would 
seem  sufficient  that  this  should  be  accompanied  with  provisions, 
preventing  the  possibility  of  the  powers  exercised  by  the  United 
States  being  ever  applied  to  British  subjects,  and  with  an  explicit 
declaration  that  these  powers  should  never  be  construed  as  an 
admission  by  Great  Britain  of  any  claim  of  the  United  States  to 
exclusive  sovereignty. 

There  is  another  important  subject  Avhich  has  not,  it  is  believed, 
ever  been  discussed  by  the  two  Powers.  This  is  the  claim  to  the 
ownership  of  the  places  settled  and  improved  under  the  convention. 
It  seems  to  me  that,  on  the  principles  of  both  natural  and  interna- 
tional law,  these  rights,  to  a  defined  extent,  should  be  respected 
by  each  Power  respectively,  whose  sovereignty  over  the  portion  of 
the  territory  in  which  such  improved  settlements  may  be  situated 
will  ultimately  be  recognized.  It  appears  also  that  the  United 
States  may,  in  conformity  with  the  convention,  and  without 
alfecting  in  any  shape  the  claims  advanced  by  Great  Britain,  pass 
a  law  declaring  that  they  abandon  or  grant  without  warranty,  to  such 
of  their  citizens  as  shall  have  made  actual  and  bona  fide  settle- 
ments in  any  part  of  Oregon,  under  the  convention,  all  the  rights 
of  and  claims  to  the  ownership  of  the  soil,  on  which  such  settle- 
ments shall  have  been  made,  which  the  United  States  may  now  or 
hereafter  claim  or  acquire :  limiting  and  defining  the  extent  of  the 
grant  in  the  same  manner  as  would  be  done  if  such  grant  was 
absolute;  and  promising  that  the  title  should  be  confirmed,  in 
case  and  whenever  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States  was 
recognized  or  asserted  and  maintained. 


m 


1 11 


J  hi 


w 


43 

The  prolongation,  in  1827,  of  the  convention  of  1818,  was 
evidently  intended  as  a  temporary  measure,  since  it  was  made 
revocable  at  the  will  of  either  party.  The  plenipotentiaries  of 
the  two  Powers  had  been  unable  to  hgree  on  the  terms  of  a  defini- 
tive arrangement,  or  even  in  defining  with  precivsion  the  conditions 
on  which  the  convention  of  1818  might  be  continued  for  a  deter- 
minate period.  It  will  be  seen,  by  reference  to  the  protocols  and 
correspondence,  that,  although  it  was  generally  admitted  that 
neither  party  ought  during  such  continuance  to  exercise  any 
exclusive  sovereignty  over  the  territory,  the  American  Plenipo- 
tentiary declined  to  agree  to  any  convention  containing  an  express 
provision  to  that  effect,  or  accompanied  by  the  insertion  in  the 
protocol  of  a  declaration  for  the  same  purpose  by  the  British 
Plenipotentiaries.  The  reason  was  not  only  because  an  exclusive 
right  over  Astoria  and  its  dependencies  was  claimed  by  the  United 
States,  but  principally  because  it  was  anticipated  that,  in  order  to 
have  in  fact  an  authority  equal  to  that  exercised  by  the  Hudson 
Bay  Company,  it  would  become  necessary  for  the  United  States 
to  perform  acts  which  the  British  Government  might  contend  to 
be  forbidden  by  such  express  provision  or  declaration.  The  con- 
sequence was,  that  the  convention  recognizes  some  certain  rights, 
and  imposes  no  positive  restrictions  but  only  such,  as  may  be  sup- 
posed to  be  implied  in  the  clause  which  ('eclares,  that  nothing 
contained  in  it  should  be  construed  to  impair  or  affect  the  claims 
of  either  party.  The  probability  that  it  might  become  necessary 
for  the  United  States  to  establish  a  territory  or  some  sort  of 
government  over  their  own  citizens  was  explicitly  avowed  ;  the 
deficiencies  of  the  renewed  convention  of  1827,  and  the  incon- 
veniences which  might  ensue,  were  fully  understood ;  and  the 
continuance  of  that  of  1818,  made  revokable  at  will,  was  agreed 
on,  with  the  hope  that  the  two  Powers  would  embrace  an  early 
opportunity,  if  not  to  make  a  definitive  arrangement,  at  least  to 
substitute  for  the  convention  another,  defining  with  precision  the 
acts  which  both  parties  should  be  allowed  or  forbidden  to  perform 
so  long  as  the  sovereignty  remained  in  abeyance. 

The  inconveniences  alluded  to  have  been  fairly  stated  in  this 
paper,  and  some  of  the  means  by  which  they  may  be  avoided 


43 

have  been  suggested.     It   is  not,  therefore,  on  account  of  the 
intrinsic  value  of  the  convention  that  its  abrogation  is  objectionable 
and  dangerous.     It  is  because  nothing  is  substituted  in  its  place  ; 
it  is  because,  if  the  two  Powers  are  not  yet  prepared  to  make  a 
definitive   agreement,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  both  Governments, 
instead  of  breaking  the  only  barrier  which  still  preserves  peace, 
to  substitute  for  the  existing  convention  one  adapted  to  the  present 
state  of  things,  and  which  shall  prevent  collisions  until  the  ques- 
tion of  sovereignty  shall  have  been  settled.     The  inconveniences 
which  were  only  anticipated  have  become  tangible,  from  the  time 
when  American  citizens,  whom  the  United  States  are  bound  to 
protect    began  to  make  settlements  in  the  territory  of  Oregon. 
The  sudden  transition,  from  an  agreement  however  defective  to  a 
promiscuous  occupancy,  without  any  provisions  whatever  that  may 
prevent  collisions,  is  highly  dangerous.     When  this  is  accompa- 
nied by  an  avowed  determination  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
to  assume  that  exclusive  sovereignty  which  Great  Britain  has  posi- 
tively declared  she  would  resist.  War  becomes  inevitable. 


,  1 
i 
,i 

i' 


NUMBER   V. 


t ,. ,  i 


m 

1  ': 


It  may  not  be  possible  to  calculate,  with  any  degree  of  certain- 
ty, the  number  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  who,  aided  by  these 
various  measures,  will,  within  any  given  period,  remove  to  the 
territory  beyond  the  Stony  Mountains.  It  is  certain  that  this 
number  will  annually  increase,  and  keep  pace  with  the  rapid  in- 
crease of  the  population  of  the  V/estern  States.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  ultimately,  and  at  no  very  distant  time,  they  will  have 
possession  of  all  that  is  worth  being  occupied  in  the  territory. 
On  what  principle,  then,  will  the  right  of  sovereignty  be  de- 
cided ? 

It  may,  however,  be  a.sked  whether,  if  this  be  the  inevitable 
consequence  of  the  continuance  of  the  convention,  England  will 
not  herself  give  notice  that  it  shall  be  abrogated.     It  might  be 
sufficient  to  answer  that  we  must  wait  till  that  notice  shall  have 
been  given,  and  the  subsequent  measures  which  England  means 
to  adopt  shall  have  been  made  known  to  us,  before  we  assume 
rashly  a  hostile  position.     The  United  States  may  govern  them- 
selves ;  although  they  may  irritate  Great  Britain,  they  cannot  con- 
trol the  acts  of  her  Government.     The  British  Government  will 
do  whatever  it  may  think  proper ;  but  for  the  consequences  that 
may  ensue  it  will  be  alone  responsible.     Should  the  abrogation  of 
the  convention  on  her  part  be  followed  by  aggressive  measures ; 
should  she  assume  exclusive  possession  over  Oregon  or  any  part 
of  it,  as  it  is  now  proposed  that  the  United  States  should  do, 
America  will  then  be  placed  in  a  defensive  position  j  the  war,  if 
any  should  ensue,  will  be  one  unprovoked  by  her,  a  war  purely  of 


i. 


45 

defence,  which  will  be  not  only  sustained,  but  approved  by  the 
unanimous  voice  of  (he  nation.  We  may,  however,  be  permitted 
to  examine  what  motive  could  impel  England,  what  interest  she 
might  have,  either  in  annulling  the  convention  or  in  adopting  ag- 
gressive measures. 

When  it  is  recommended  that  the  United  States  should  give 
notice  of  the  abrogation  of  the  convention,  it  is  with  the  avowed 
object  of  adopting  measures  forbidden  by  the  convention,  and 
which  Great  Britain  has  uniformly  declared  she  would  resist.  But, 
according  to  the  view  of  the  subject  uniformly  taken  by  her,  from 
the  first  time  she  asserted  the  rights  she  claims  to  this  day,  the 
simple  abrogation  of  her  convention  with  the  United  States  will 
produce  no  effect  whatever  on  the  rights,  relations,  and  position 
of  the  two  Powers.  Great  Britain,  from  the  date  at  least  of 
Cook's  third  voyage,  and  prior  to  the  Nootka  convention,  did  deny 
the  exclusive  claim  of  Spain,  and  assert  that  her  subjects  had,  in 
common  with  those  of  other  States,  the  right  freely  to  trade  with 
the  natives,  and  to  settle  in  any  part  of  the  Northwestern  coast  of 
America,  not  already  occupied  by  the  subjects  of  Spain.  The 
Nootka  convention  was  nothing  more  than  the  acquiescence,  on 
the  part  of  Spain,  in  the  claims  thus  asserted  by  Great  Britain, 
leaving  the  sovereignty  in  abeyance.  And  the  convention  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
a  temporaiy  recognition  of  the  same  principle^  so  far  as  the  two 
parties  wert  concerned.  England  had,  prior  to  that  convention, 
fully  admitted  that  the  United  States  possessed  the  same  rights  as 
were  claimed  by  her.  The  abrogation  of  the  convention  by  her 
will  leave  those  rights  precisely  in  Ihe  same  situation  as  they  now 
stand,  and  as  they  stood  prior  to  the  convention.  It  cannot  there- 
fore be  perceived  what  possible  benefit  could  accrue  to  Great  Bri- 
tain from  her  abrogation  of  that  instrument ;  unless,  discarding  all 
her  former  declarations,  denying  all  that  she  has  asserted  for 
more  than  sixty  years,  retracting  her  admission  of  the  equal  rio-hts 
of  the  United  States  to  trade,  to  occupy,  and  to  make  settlements 
in  any  part  of  the  country,  she  should,  without  cause  or  pretext, 
assume,  as  is  now  threatened  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  ex* 
elusive  sovereignty  over  the  whole  or  part  of  the  territory.     It  may 


46 


if 


be  pri  milted  to  believe  that  the  British  Government  entertains  no 
such  intention. 

It  may  also  be  observed  that  England  has  heretofore  evinced  no 
disposition  whatever  to  colonize  the  territory  in  question.  She 
has,  indeed,  declared  most  cxplicilly  her  determination  to  protect 
the  British  interests  that  had  been  created  by  British  enterprise  and 
capital  in  that  (piarter.  But,  by  giving  a  monopoly  of  the  fur  trade 
to  the  Hudson  Bay  Company,  she  has  virtually  arrested  private 
efforts  on  the  part  of  British  subjects.  Her  Government  has  been 
in  every  other  respect  altogether  inactive,  and  apparently  careless 
about  the  ultimate  fate  of  Oregon.  The  country  has  been  open 
to  her  enterprise  at  least  fifty  years ;  and  there  are  no  other  Bri- 
tish settlements  or  interests  within  its  limits  than  those  vested  in,  or 
connected  with  the  Hudson  Bay  Company.  Whether  the  British 
Government  will  hereafter  make  any  effort  towards  that  object 
cannot  be  known  ;  but  as  long  as  this  right  to  colonize  Oregon 
shall  remain  common  to  both  Po\ve;s,  the  United  States  have  no- 
thing to  apprehend  from  the  competition. 

The  negotiations  on  that  subject  between  the  two  Governments 
have  been  carried  on,  on  both  sides,  with  perfect  candor.  The 
views  and  intentions  of  both  parties  were  mutually  communicated 
without  reserve.  The  conviction  on  the  part  of  America  that  the 
country  must  ultimately  be  occupied  and  settled  by  her  agricul- 
tural emigrants,  was  used  as  an  argument  why,  in  case  of  a  divi- 
sion of  the  territory,  the  greater  share  should  be  allotted  to  the 
United  ^States.  The  following  quotation,  from  the  American 
statement  of  the  case  of  December,  1826,  proves  that  this  expec- 
tation was  fairly  avowed  at  the  time  : 


"  If  the  present  state  of  occupancy  is  urged  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain, 
the  probability  of  the  manner  in  which  the  territory  west  of  tlie  Rocky 
Mountains  must  be  settled  belongs  also  essentially  to  the  suliject.  Under 
whatever  nominal  sovereignty  that  country  may  be  placed,  and  wliatever 
its  ultimate  destinies  may  be,  it  is  ncaiiy  reduced  to  a  certainty  that  it  will  be 
almost  exclusively  peopled  by  the  surplus  population  of  the  United  States. 
The  distance  i'rom  Great  Britain,  and  the  expense  incident  to  emigration, 
forbid  the  expectation  of  any  being  practicable  from  that  quarter  but  on  a 
comparatively  small  scale.     Allowing  the  rate  of  increase  to  be  the  same  in 


no 


47 

the  United  StaLes  and  in  the  \<irtli  American  British  possessions,  the  dif- 
ference in  the  actual  poimlation  of  holli  is  siicli  that  the  pniures-ivc  rate 
which  would,  witliin  forty  years,  sidd  tiiree  million.'^  to  tliosc,  wniild  within 
the  same  time  give  a  positive  increase  of  more  than  twenty  millions  to  the 
United  States.  And  if  circiimf;tancep,  arisinjf  from  localities  and  hahits. 
have  piven  superior  facilities  to  IJritish  isuhjects  of  exteudinjf  their  commerce 
with  the  natives,  and  to  that  expam-ion  which  lias  the  appearance,  and  the 
appearance  only,  of  occupancy,  the  sloucr  hut  sure  progress  and  extension 
of  an  aj^'ricultural  population  will  he  regulated  by  distanc;',  by  natural 
obstacles,  and  by  its  own  amount." 

There  was  no  exaggeration  in  that  comparative  view ;  the  su- 
periority of  the  progressive  increase  of  popdation  in  the  United 
States  was,  on  the  contrary,  underrated.  The  essential  difference 
is,  that  migration  from  the  United  States  to  Oregon  is  the  result 
of  purely  natural  causes,  whilst  England,  in  order  to  colonize 
that  country,  must  resort  to  artificial  means.  The  number  of 
American  emigrants  may  not,  during  the  first  next  ensuing  years, 
be  as  great  as  seems  to  be  anticipated.  It  will  at  first  be  limited 
by  the  amount  of  provisions  with  which  the  earlier  settlers  can 
supply  them  during  the  first  year,  and  till  they  can  raise  a  crop 
themselves;  and  the  rapidity  with  which  a  new  country  may  be 
settled  is  also  lessened  where  maize  cannot  be  piufitably  culti- 
vated. ' 

Whether  more  or  less  prompt,  the  result  is  nevertheless  indubi- 
table. The  snowball  sooner  or  later  becomes  an  avalanche:  where 
the  cultivator  of  the  soil  has  once  made  a  permanent  establishment 
game  and  hunters  disappear;  within  a  few  years  the  fur  trade 
will  have  died  its  natural  death,  and  no  vestige  shall  remain,  at 
least  south  of  Fuca's  Straits,  of  that  temporary  occupancy,  of 
those  vested  British  interests,  which  the  British  Government  is 
now  bound  to  protect.  When  the  whole  territory  shall  have  thus 
fallen  in  the  possession  of  an  agricultural  industrious  po^.ulation, 
the  question  recurs,  by  what  principle  will  then  the  right  of  sove- 
reignty, all  along  kept  in  abeyance,  be  determined  ? 

The  answer  is  obvious.  In  conformity  with  natural  law,  with 
that  right  of  occupancy  for  which  Great  Britain  has  always  con- 
tended, the  occupiers  of  the  land,  the  inhabitants  of  the  country, 
from  whatever  quarter  they  may  have  come,  will  be  of  right  as 


HI 


.;,(! 


4S 


I      1 


i\ 


:^.  I  « 


%\ 


■]■: 
li 

vi 


well  as  in  fact  the  sole  legitimate  sovereigns  of  Oregon.  When- 
ever  sufTiciently  numerous,  lliey  will  decide  whether  it  suits  them 
best  to  be  an  independent  nation  or  an  integral  part  of  our  great 
Republic.  There  cannot  be  the  slightest  apprehension  that  they 
will  choose  to  become  a  dependent  colony  ;  for  they  will  be  the 
most  powerful  nation  bordering  on  the  American  shores  of  the  Pa- 
cific, and  will  not  »tand  in  need  of  protection  against  either  their 
Russian  or  Mexican  neighbors.  Viewed  as  an  abstract  proposi- 
tion, Mr.  Jefferson's  opinion  appears  correct,  that  it  will  be  best 
for  both  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  American  nations,  whilst  enter- 
taining the  most  friendly  relations,  to  remain  independent  rather 
than  to  be  united  under  the  same  Government.  But  this  conclu- 
sion is  premature;  and  the  decision  must  be  left  to  posterity. 
It  has  been  attempted  in  these  papers  to  prove — 

1.  'I'hat  neither  of  the  two  Powers  has  an  absolute  and  indis- 
putable right  to  the  whole  contested  territory ;  that  each  may  re- 
cede from  its  extreme  pretensions  without  impairing  national  honor 
or  wounding  national  pride ;  and  that  the  way  is  therefore  still 
open  for  a  renewal  of  negotiations. 

2.  That  the  avowed  object  of  the  United  States,  in  giving  notice 
of  the  abrogation  of  the  convention,  is  the  determination  to  assert 
and  maintain  their  assumed  right  of  absolute  and  exclusive  sove- 
reignty over  the  whole  territory ;  that  Great  Britain  is  lully  com- 
mitted on  that  point,  and  has  constantly  and  explicitly  declared 
that  such  an  attempt  would  be  resisted,  and  the  British  interests 
in  that  quarter  be  protected ;  and  that  war  is  therefore  the  una- 
voidable consequence  of  such  a  decisive  step — a  war  not  only  ne- 
cessarily calamitous  and  expensive,  but  in  its  character  aggressive, 
not  justifiable  by  the  magnitude  and  importance  of  its  object,  and 
of  which  the  chances  are  uncertain. 

3.  That  the  inconveniences  of  the  present  state  of  things  may  in 
a  great  degree  be  avoided  ;  that,  if  no  war  should  ensue,  they  will 
be  the  same,  if  not  greater,  without  than  under  a  convention ;  that 
not  a  single  object  can  be  gained  by  giving  the  notice  at  this  time, 
unless  it  be  to  do  something  not  permitted  by  the  present  conven'- 
tion,  and  therefore  provoking  resistance  and  productive  of  war.  If 


4$ 

a  single  other  advantage  can  be  gained  by  giving  the  notice,  let 
it  be  stated. 

4th.  Ihat  it  has  been  fully  admitted  by  Great  Britain  that, 
whether  under  or  without  a  convention,  the  United  States  have 
the  same  rights  as  herseN",  to  trade,  to  navigate,  and  to  occupy  and 
make  settlements  in  and  over  every  part  of  the  territory  ;  and  that, 
if  this  state  of  things  be  not  disturbed,  natural  causes  must  neces- 
sarily give  the  whole  territory  to  the  United  States. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  only  asked,  that  the  subject 
may  be  postponed  for  the  present ;  that  Government  should  not 
commit  itself  by  any  premature  act  or  declaration  ;  that,  instead 
of  increasing  the  irritation  and  excitement  which  exist  on  both 
sides,  time  be  given  for  mutual  reflection,  and  for  the  subdual  or 
subsidence  of  angry  and  violent  feelings.  Then,  and  then  only, 
can  the  deliberate  opinion  of  the  American  people  on  this  momen- 
tous question  be  truly  ascertained.  It  is  not  perceived  how  the 
postponement  for  the  present  and  for  a  time  in,  in  any  shape  or  in 
the  slightest  degree,  injure  the  United  States. 

It  is  certainly  true  that  England  is  very  powerful,  and  has 
often  abused  her  power,  in  no  case  in  a  more  outrageous  manner 
than  by  the  impressment  of  seamen,  whether  American,  English, 
or  other  foreigners,  sailing  under  and  protected  by  the  American 
flag.  I  am  not  aware  that  there  has  ever  been  any  powerful 
nation,  even  in  modern  times,  and  professing  Christianity,  which 
has  not  occasionally  abused  its  power.  The  United  States,  who 
always  appealed  to  justice  during  their  early  youth,  seem,  as  their 
strength  and  power  increase,  to  give  symptoms  of  a  similar  dispo- 
sition. Instead  of  useless  and  dangerous  recriminations,  might 
not  the  two  nations,  by  their  united  etlorts,  promote  a  great  object, 
and  worthy  of  their  elevated  situation  ? 

With  the  single  exception  of  the  territory  of  Oregon,  which 
extends  from  42  to  54^  40'  north  latitude,  all  the  American  shores 
of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  from  Cape  Horn  to  Behring's  Straits,  are 
occupied,  on  the  north  by  the  factories  of  the  Russian  Fur  Com- 
pany, southwardly  by  semi-civilized  States,  a  mixture  of  Europe- 
ans of  Spanish  descent  and  of  native  Indians,  who,  notwithstand- 
ing the  efforts  of  enlightened,  intelligent,  and  liberal  men,  have 

4 


'S 


so 


f  .1' 


i*'11 


'■I 

ifiii 


,i>V 


heretofore  failed  in  the  attempt  to  establish  governments  founded 
on  law,  that  might  ensure  liberty,  preserve  order,  and  protect 
persons  ar.d  property.     It  is  in  Oregon  alone  that  we  may  hope 
to  see  a  portion  of  the  western  shores  of  America  occupied  and 
inhabited  by  an  active  and  enlightened  nation,  which  may  exer- 
cise a  moral  inflnence  over  her  less  favored  neighbors,  and  extend 
to  them  the  benefits  of  a  more  advanced  civilisation.     It  is  on  that 
account  that  the  wish  has  been  expressed  that  the  Oregon  territo- 
ry may  not  be  divided.     The  United  States  and  England   are 
the  only  Powers  who  lay  any  claim  to  that  country,  the  only 
nations  which  may  and  must  inhabit  it.     It  is  not,  fortunately,  in 
the  power  of  either  Government  to  prevent  this  taking  place ;  but 
it  depends  upon  them,  whether  they  shall  unite  in  promoting  the 
object,  or  whether  they  shall  bring  on  both  countries  the  calamities 
of  an  useless  war,  which  may  retard  but  not  prevent  the  ultimate 
result.     It  matters  but  little  whether  the  inhabitants  shall  come 
from  England'  or  from  the  United  States.     It  would  seem  that 
more  importance  might  be  attached  to  the  fact  that,  within  a 
period  of  fifteen  years,  near  one  million  of  souls  are  now  added  to 
the  population   of  the  United  States   by   migrations  from  the 
dominions  of  Great  Britain  ;  yet,  since  permitted  by  both  Powers, 
they  may  be  presumed  to  be  beneficial  to  .oth.     The  emigrants 
to  Oregon,  whether  Americans  or  English,  will  be  united  together 
by  the  community  of  language  and  literature,  of  the  principles  of 
law,  and  of  all  the  fundamental  elements  of  a  similar  civilisation. 
The  establishment  of  a  kindred  and  friendly  Power  on  the 
Norlh-west  Coast  of  America  is  all  that  England  can  expect,  all 
perhaps  that  the  United  States  ought  to  desire.     It  seems  almost 
incredible  that,  whilst  that  object  may  be  attained  by  simply  not 
impeding  the  effect  of  natural  causes,  two  kindred  nations,  having 
such  powerful  motives  to  remain  at  peace,  and  standing  at  the 
head  of  European  and  American  civilisation,  should,  in  this  enlight- 
ened age,  givd  to  the  world  the  scandalous  spectacle,  perhaps  not 
unwelcome  'o  some  of  the  beholders,  of  an  unnatural  and  an  unne- 
cessary war  ;  that  they  should  apply  all  their  faculties  and  exhaust 
their  resources  in  inflicting,  each  on  the  other,  every  injury  in  their 
power,  and  for  what  purpose  ?     The  certain  consequence,  inde- 


r 


tl 


pendent  of  all  the  direct  calamities  and  miseries  of  war,  will  be  a 
mutual  increase  of  debt  and  taxation,  and  the  ultimate  fate  of 
Oregon  will  be  the  same  as  if  the  war  Vad  not  taken  place. 


i  i^ 


I      ;    .'I 


,i     ! 


Jli 


M 


.   1 


.;)'i'?Hf 


ii" 


APPENDIX. 


WAR  EXPENSES, 


Those  expenses  may  be  arranged  under  three  heads :  1st.  Such 
as  are  of  a  permanent  nature,  and  should  be  considered  as  belong- 
ing to  the  Peace  establishment  of  the  country.  2dly.  Those  which 
should  be  adopted  when  there  is  an  impending  danger  of  war. 
3dly.  Those  which  actual  war  renders  necessaiy. 

To  the  first  class  belong  all  those,  which  provide  for  objects  that 
require  considerable  time  to  be  execu  and  cannot,  without 
great  difficulty,  be  accomplished  pending  a  war.  Such  are 
fortifications,  building  ships  of  war  including  steamers,  accumu- 
lating materials  for  the  same  purpose.  Navy  Yard-  providing 
a  sufficient  artillery,  and  other  important  objects  of  the  ord- 
nance department.  It  may  be  taken  for  granted,  that  Government 
has  done,  or  will  do  all  that  is  necessary  and  practicable  in  ihat 
respect. 

The  preparatory  measures  which  should  be  adopted,  when  there 
is  danger  of  war,  are  those  respecting  which  the  greatest  variety 
of  opinions  must  be  expected.  It  has  been  repeatedly  assei  w, 
that  such  is  the  structure  of  our  Government,  that  it  never  will  or 
can  prepare  for  war,  till  after  it  has  actually  commenced ;  that  is 
to  say,  that,  because  Congress  was  dilatory  in  making  effectual 
provision  for  carrying  on  the  last  war  against  Great  Britain,  and 
because  the  Administration,  at  the  time  when  it  was  declared,  was 


54 


urn 


,,,:•>•» 


inefficient  and  not  well  calculated  for  conducting  it,  the  United 
States  are  bound  for  ever  to  incur,  at  the  commencement  of  every 
war,  the  disasters  of  one  or  two  years,  before  they  can  be  induced 
*o  put  on  their  armor.  The  past  is  irrevocable  and  of  no  other 
use,  than  as  far  as  it  may  teach  us  to  avoid  the  faults  that  were 
formerly  committed.  When  our  Government  relies  on  the  people 
for  being  sustained  in  making  war,  its  confidence  must  be  entire. 
They  must  be  told  the  whole  truth ;  and  if  they  are  really  in  fa- 
vor of  war,  they  will  cheerfully  sustain  Government  in  all  the 
measures  necessary  to  carry  it  into  effect.  The  frank  annunciation 
of  the  necessity  of  such  measures  is  called,  "  creating  a  panic."  It 
is  not  the  first  time  that  under  similar  circumstances  the  same  lan- 
guage has  been  held.  If  ^nere  be  no  danger  or  intention  of  making 
war,  those  create  a  panic,  who  proclaim  a  determination  to  assert 
the  exclusive  sovereignty  of  the  United  States  over  the  whole  con- 
tested territory,  with  the  full  knowledge  that  Great  Britain  has 
uniformly  and  explicitly  declared,  that  she  would  resist  any  such 
attempt.  If  instead  of  telling  the  people  the  whole  truth,  the  at- 
tempt to  conceal  from  them  the  necessity  of  the  measures  requisite 
for  car-ying  on  the  war  should  be  successful,  a  reaction  in  the  pub- 
lic sentiment  will  most  certainly  take  place,  whenever  it  will  have 
become  impossible  to  delay  any  longer  the  heavy  burden  of  taxa- 
tion, for  which  the  Nation  had  not  been  prepared. 

I  will  not  dwell  on  the  necessary  preparations  of  a  military  cha- 
racter, otherwise  than  by  referring  to  some  notorious  facts. 

The  primary  causes  of  the  disastrous  results  of  the  campaign  of 
1812,  were  the  want  of  a  naval  force  on  the  Lakes,  and  that  of  a 
suflScient  regular  force.  Governmc  tit  had  <  Ijtained  a  correct  state- 
ment of  the  regular  force  of  the  British  in  Canada,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  garrison  of  Quebec,  This  last  was  estimated  at 
about  three  thousand  men,  and  could  not  be  lessened  without  great 
inconvenience  and  some  danger.  The  regular  force  at  Montreal, 
St.  John's,  and  Three  Rivers,  amounted  to  1 130  men  ;  that  in  the 
whole  of  Upper  Canada,  to  720.  The  act  to  raise  an  additional 
military  force  of  25,000  men  was  passed  on  the  11th  <  f  January, 
1812.  The  selection  of  the  oflficers  was  not  completed  before  the 
termination  of  that  year  j  the  recruiting  service  was  nut  organized 


mumm 


55 


in  time ;  the  enlistments  for  the  regular  army  fell  short  of  the  most 
moderate  calculation ;  and  the  total  number  recruited  was  so  small, 
as  to  render  it  impossible  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  on  any  one  of 
the  most  important  points  from  Montreal  upwards,  insignificant  as 
was  the  force  by  which  they  were  defended.  The  volunteer  act 
was  also  extremely  unproductive.  At  that  time  the  treasury  was 
amply  supplied ;  and  the  v;ant  was  not  that  of  money,  but  of  a 
regular  force. 

Such  force  cannot  be  raised  without  money  ;  and  yet  it  will  be 
admitted  that  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  induce  Congress 
to  lay  internal  taxes  or  duties  before  war  was  declared  or  certain. 
In  order  to  provide  means  for  having  an  additional  regular  force 
ready  to  act  as  soon  as  actual  war  takes  place,  a  loan  and  Trea- 
sury notes  must  be  resorted  to.     But  it  is  deemed  absolutely  ne- 
cessary, that  the  internal  taxes  should  be  imposed  simultaneously 
with  the  declaration  of  war,  and  that  provision  should  be  made 
for  their  immediate  collection.     With  the  exception  of  the  act  for 
doubling  the  duties  on  importations,  Congress  did  not  pass  any 
law  for  imposing  any  new  taxes  or  duties,  till  more  than  one  year 
after  the  declaration  of  the  last  war ;  nor  did  it  even  lay  a  second 
direct  tax  in  the  year  1814.     It  was  not  till  after  public  credit 
was  iruined,  after  Treasury  notes  which  were  had  due  remained 
unpaid,  and  after  Mr.  Dallas  had  been  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
Treasury,  that  at  last  the  laws  for  imposing  a  double  direct  tax, 
for  increasing  the  rate  of  the  existing  internal  duties,  and  for  laying 
new  ones,  were  enacted.     The  peace  was  ratified  immediately 
after;  and  in  point  of  fact,  no  more  than  3,877,000  dollars  were 
paid  in  the  Treasviry  before  the  end  of  the  war,  on  account  of  the 
direct  tax  and  all  other  internal  taxes  or  duties.     There  were 
received  from  the  same  sources  20,654,000  dollars  in  the  years 
1815,  1816  and  1817. 

The  preparatory  measures  necessary,  in  order  to  insure  an  im- 
mediate collection  of  internal  taxes,  whenever  the  laws  imposing 
such  taxes  shall  have  been  passed,  are  those  on  which  I  may 
speak  with  confidence.  These  consist  simply  in  a  previous  or- 
ganization of  the  machinery  necessary  for  the  collection  of  every 
species  of  internal  taxes,  and  the  assessment  of  a  direct   tax. 


'  1 


56 


!  I' 


The  proper  selection  of  the  numerous  officers  necessary  for  the 
collection  always  consumes  several  months.  A  previous  selection 
and  appointment  of  those  officers  would  obviate  that  difficulty, 
and  would  cost  nothing,  as  though  appointed  they  should  receive 
no  pay  till  called  into  actual  service ;  this  would  be  the  natural 
consequence  of  the  manner  in  which  collectors  are  paid,  this  being 
a  per  centage  on  the  money  collected.  The  only  other  necessary 
measure  in  that  respect,  is  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
should,  at  the  time  of  their  appointment,  supply  the  collectors  with 
all  the  necessary  forms  of  keeping  and  rendering  their  accounts. 

The  assessment  in  each  State  of  the  taxable  property  of  every 
individual  who  possesses  such  property,  is  the  only  operation 
which  requires  considerable  time  and  causes  a  proportionate  delay. 
This  cannot  be  otherwise  obviated  than  by  making  that  assess- 
ment a  preparatory  measure,  to  be  completed  before  actual  war 
takes  place. 

In  order  to  facilitate  and  hasten  the  process  of  assessment,  I 
undertook,  in  the  year  1812,  to  apportion  the  direct  tax  on  the 
several  Counties  and  State  Districts  in  each  State ;  and  the  Act  of 
2d  August,  1813,  which  laid  a  direct  tax  of  three  millions  of 
dollars,  was  passed  in  conformity  with  that  apportionment.  The 
process  was  easy  for  every  State  in  which  there  was  a  direct  State 
tax;  but  though  derived  from  the  best  data  that  could  be  col- 
lected, it  was  defective  and  partly  arbitrary  for  the  States  in 
which  there  was  no  State  tax.  As  there  is  at  present  hardly  any 
(if  any)  State  which  has  not  laid  a  direct  State  tax,  this  mode 
may  be  adopted  for  the  proposed  preparatory  assessment.  This 
will  reduce  the  duty  of  the  assessors  to  the  assessment  of  the  quota 
of  each  County  or  District,  on  the  several  individuals  liable  to  the 
tax,  and  the  total  expense  of  the  assessment  to  a  sum  not  exceeding 
probably  two  hundred  thousand  dollars.  A  more  regular  and 
correct  assessment  will,  of  course,  be  provided  for,  with  respect  to 
the  direct  taxes  which  may  be  laid  after  the  first  year  of  the  war 

The  only  objection  is  that  of  the  expense,  which  would  prove 
useless  if  the  tax  should  not  be  laid,  or  in  other  words,  if  war 
should  not  take  place ;  but  certainly  this  is  too  small  an  item  to 
deserve  consideration. 


m 


This  organization,  easy  and  cheap  as  it  is,  is  all  that  is  necessary 
in  order  to  secure  an  immediate  collection  of  a  direct  and  other 
internal  taxes  and  duties,  from  the  moment  when  they  shall  have 
been  imposed  by  Congress. 

The  probable  annual  expenses  which  must  be  incurred  in  a 
war  with  England,  and  the  resources  for  defraying  them,  are  the 
next  objects  of  inquiry. 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  draw  any  correct  inference  from  the 
expenses  of  the  last  war  with  England:  the  amount  of  the  arrear- 
ages due  on  account  of  the  military  services  at  the  time  when  the 
peace  was  ratified,  is  not  stated  with  precision  in  any  of  the  public 
documents  which  I  have  seen.  Although  the  laws  show  the 
number  of  men  voted,  that  of  those  actually  raised  has  never  to 
my  knowledge  been  officially  stated.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  want  of  a  proper  organization  increased  the  amount  of  expendi- 
ture much  beyond  that  which  would  have  been  sufficient  under  a 
regular  and  efficient  system.  This  has  undoubtedly  been  much  im- 
proved ;  yet  the  expenses  incurred  in  the  Seminole  war,  compared 
with  the  number  of  men  employed  and  that  of  the  hostile  Indians, 
show  that  either  there  are  still  some  defects  in  the  organization, 
or  that  there  were  great  abuses  in  the  execution. 

The  payments  from  the  Treasury  for  the  military  department, 
embracing  only  those  for  the  army  proper,  militia  and  volunteers, 
and  exclusive  of  those  for  fortifications  and  the  Indian  department, 
amounted  for  the  year  1813  to  18,936,000  dollars,  and  for  the 
year  1814  to  20,508,000  dollars.  The  disbursements  for  the 
navy  are  stated  at  6,446,000  and  7,311,000  dollars  for  these  two 
years  respectively.  By  comparing  the  reports  of  the  Secretaries 
of  the  Treasury  of  December  1815,  1816,  1817,  it  would  appear 
that  the  arrearages  due  on  1st  January,  1815,  exceeded  ten 
millions  of  dollars :  and  it  seems  certain  that  the  actual  war  ex- 
penses of  1814  could  not  have  fallen  short  of  35  to  40  millions  of 
dollars.  It  has  been  asserted  that  the  regular  force  during  that 
year  amounted  to  35,000  men. 

The  population  of  the  United  States  has  nearly  trebled  during 
the  thirty-four  years  which  have  elapsed  since  that  in  which  the 
last  war   against  England   was  declared.     Their  wealth  and 


S8 


I.I 


I  •:  ^i 


I     I, 


Yii'r 


iii 


resources  have  increased  in  the  same  ratio ;  and  that,  in  case  of 
war,  these  should  be  brought  into  action  as  promptly  as  possible, 
admits  of  no  doubt.  Once  engaged  in  the  conflict,  to  make  the 
war  as  efficient  as  possible  will  shorten  its  duration,  and  can  alone 
secure  honorable  terras  of  peace.  I  have  not  the  documents 
necessary  for  making  an  approximate  estimate  of  the  annual 
expenses  of  a  war  with  Great  Britain ;  and  if  I  had,  I  could  not 
at  this  time  perform  that  amount  of  labor  which  is  absolutely 
necessary  in  order  to  draw  correct  inferences.  Taking  only  a 
general  view  of  the  subject,  and  considering  the  great  difference 
of  expense  in  keeping  a  navy  in  active  service,  between  one  of 
eight  frigates  and  one  of  ten  ships  of  the  line,  fourteen  frigates 
and  a  competent  number  of  steamers ;  that  Texas  and  Oregon 
are  additional  objects  of  defence ;  that  the  extensive  system  of 
fortifications  which  has  been  adopted  will  require  about  fifteen 
thousand  additional  men  ;  and  that,  in  order  to  carry  a  successful 
and  decisive  war  against  the  most  vulnerable  portion  of  the  British 
dominions,  a  great  disposable  regular  force  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary ;  I  am  very  sure  that  I  fall  below  the  mark  in  saying  that, 
after  the  first  year  of  the  war,  and  when  the  resources  of  the 
country  shall  be  fully  brought  into  action,  the  annual  military  and 
naval  expenses  will  amount  to  sixty  or  seventy  millions  of  dollars. 
To  this  must  be  added  the  expenses  for  all  other  objects,  which, 
for  the  year  ending  on  the  30th  of  June,  1845,  amounted  to  near 
fifteen  millions,  but  which  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  hopes 
may  be  reduced  to  eleven  millions  and  a  half.  The  gross  annual 
expenses  for  all  objects  will  be  estimated  at  seventy-seven  millions  ; 
to  be  increased  annually  by  the  annual  interest  on  each  successive 
loan. 

In  order  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  new  revenue  and  loans 
required  to  defray  that  expense,  the  first  question  which  arises,  is 
the  diminution  of  the  revenue  derived  from  customs,  which  will  be 
the  necessary  consequence  of  the  war. 

The  actual  receipts  into  the  Treasury,  arising  from  that  source 
of  revenue,  were  in  round  numbers  for  the  years  1812, 1813, 1814, 
respectively  8,960,000,  13,225,000,  and  6,000,000  of  dollars  ;  and 
the  nett  revenue  which  accrued  during  those  three  years  respect- 


69 

ively  amounted  to  13,142,000,  6,708,000,  and  4,250,000  dollars. 
From  the  1st  of  July,  1812,  the  rate  of  duties  on  importations  was 
doubled ;  and  in  order  to  compare  these  receipts  with  those  col- 
lected in  peace  time,  they  must  be  reduced  for  those  three  years 
respectively,  to  7,470,000,*  6,600,000  and  3,000,000 ;  or,  if  the 
revenue  accrued  be  compared  (which  is  the  correct  mode),  to 
9,850,000,*  3,354,000,  and  2,125,000  dollars.  At  that  time  the 
duties  accrued  were,  on  account  of  the  credit  allowed,  collected  on 
an  average  only  six  or  eight  months  later ;  and  the  unexpected 
importations  in  the  latter  half  of  the  year  1812  in  American  ves- 
sels which  arrived  with  British  licenses,  subsequent  to  the  decla- 
ration of  war  and  to  the  act  which  doubled  the  rr.te  of  duties, 
swelled  considerably  the  receipts  of  the  year  1813.  It  was  only 
in  1814  that  the  full  effect  of  the  war  on  the  revenue  derived 
from  that  source  was  felt. 

The  diminution  in  the  amount  of  American  and  foreign  tonnage 
employed  in  the  foreign  trade  of  the  United  States  is  strongly 
exhibited  by  the  following  statement : 

Tonnage  in  foreign  trade,  U.  S.      American  ves.  Foreign  ves.  Total. 

Year  1811  948,207  33,203  981,450 

"    1812  667,999  47,099  715,098 

«    1813  237,348  113,827  351,175 

«    1814  59,626  ^      48,302  107,928 

And  it  must  be  recollected  that  during  the  last  nine  months  of 
1814,  Great  Britain  was  at  peace  with  all  the  other  Powers  of 
Europe,  and  that  these  were  therefore  neutrals.  Yet  they  hardly 
ventured  to  trade  with  us. 

The  amount  of  receipts  into  the  Treasury  derived  from  customs, 
as  well  as  that  of  the  revenue  accrued,  exceeded,  during  the 
eleven  years  1801  to  1811,  132,700,000  dollars,  being  an  annual 
average  of  about  12,000,000  dollars.  During  the  same  eleven 
years  the  average  amount  of  tonnage  employed  in  the  foreign  trade 
of  the  United  States  was  943,670  tons,  of  which  844,170  were 
in  American,  and  99,500  foreign  vessels. 


I 

;l 
i| 


*  Estimated  for  1812. 


60 


M 

"P 


■A 


■* 


|i ;     I ' 


I',  lie 


Thus  in  the  year  1814,  the  revenue  derived  from  customs  had 
been  reduced  to  one  fourth  part  (to  nearly  one  sixth  part,  if  com- 
pared according  to  the  revenue  accrued,  or  amount  of  importa- 
tions), the  tonnage  employed  in  the  foreign  trade  of  the  United 
States  to  nearly  one  ninth;  and  that  of  the  American  vessels 
employed  in  that  trade,  to  one  fourteenth  part  of  their  respective 
:.verage  amount  during  the  eleven  years  of  peace. 

The  small  American  navy  did  during  the  last  war  with  England 
all  and  more  than  could  have  been  expected.  The  fact  was 
established  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  world  and  of  Great  Britain 
herself,  that  the  navy  of  the  United  States,  with  a  parity  of  force, 
was  at  least  equal  to  that  of  England.  But  the  prodigious  numeri- 
cal superiority  of  the  British  navy  rendered  it  impossible  for  a  few 
frigates  to  protect  the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  which  was 
accordingly  almost  annihilated.  We  have  now  ten  ships  of  the 
line,  and  a  proportionate  number  of  frigates  and  smaller  vessels. 
The  great  numerical  superiority  of  the  British  navy  still  continues ; 
and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that,  in  case  of  war,  every  exertion  will 
be  made  by  the  British  Government  to  maintain  its  superiority  in 
our  seas  and  on  our  coasts.  Still  it  is  but  a  portion  of  her  force 
that  can  be  employed  in  that  way,  and,  taking  every  circumstance 
into  consideration,  it  may  be  confidently  hoped  that  our  commerce, 
though  much  lessened,  will  be  partially  protected  by  our  navy. 
Although  the  actual  diminution  which  will  be  experienced  is  alto- 
gether conjectural,  I  think  that  no  great  error  is  to  be  apprehended 
in  estimating  the  revenue  from  customs,  after  the  first  year  of  the 
war,  at  about  one  half  of  its  present  amount ;  and  the  whole 
revenue  from  that  source,  from  the  sale  of  lands  and  all  the 
branches  of  the  existing  income,  at  fourteen  milUons  of  dollars ; 
leaving  to  be  provided  for  sixty  to  sixty-five  millions,  besides  the 
interest  on  loans,  which,  for  a  war  of  three  years,  may  be  estih 
mated  at  about  six  millions  of  dollars  on  an  average.  However 
energetic  and  eflBcient  Congress  and  the  Executive  may  be,  the 
resources  and  strength  of  the  nation  can  be  but  gradually  brought 
forth :  the  expenses  will  therefore  be  less  during  the  first  year, 
after  which  the  whole  amount  will  be  required  and  will  be  annu" 


61 


ally  wanted.     In  reference  therefore  to  the  second  year  of  the 
war — 

Assuming  the  total  war  expenses  at    .    .     .     $65,000,000 
All  the  others  at .        12,000,000 

In  all, $77,000,000 

From  which  deduct  for  existing  revenue,  .     .        14,000,000 

To  be  provided  for  by  taxes  and  loans,    .     .     $63,000,000 

On  the  principle  that  the  amount  of  annual  taxes 
should  be  at  least  equal  to  the  expenses  of 
the  peace  establishment  and  the  interest  on 
the  war  loans,  annual  peace  expenses  at  .     .     27,000,000 

And  for  interest  on  the  loans  of  1st  and  2(1  years,    ; 
viz.  1st  year  25,  and  2d  year  45  millions  at 
7  per  cent 5,000,000 

"-    Together, $32,000,000 

From  which  deduct  existing  revenue,  .    .     .       14,000,000 

Leaves  to  be  provided  for  by  new  taxes,  at  least  $18,000,000 
And  by  loans, 45,000,000 

$63,000,000 

The  estimate  of  5,000,000  dollars  for  the  interest  of  the  loans 
the  second  year  after  the  war,  is  founded  on  the  supposition  that 
the  direct  and  other  internal  taxes  or  duties  laid  for  the  first  year, 
together  with  the  existing  revenue,  and  twenty-five  millions  bor- 
rowed by  loans  or  Treasury  notes,  will  be  sufficient  to  defray  the 
expense  incurred  prior  to  and  during  the  first  year  of  the  war. 
The  deficiency  in  the  regular  force  for  that  year  must  be  supplied 
by  large  drafts  of  militia,  which  will  be  as  expensive  at  least  as 
the  regular  soldiers  whose  place  they  will  supply. 

But  it  appears  very  doubtful  whether  such  a  large  sum  as  forty- 
five  millions  can  be  raised  annually  by  loans  and  Treasury  notes. 
It  is  necessary  in  the  first  place  to  correct  some  erroneous  opinions 
respecting  the  extent  to  which  these  notes  may  be  kept  in  circu- 
lation, and  the  legitimate  objects  to  which  they  may  be  applied. 

The  Treasury  notes  were  first  introduced  on  my  suggestion, 


'\i 


62 


•'\     •! 


ii'.t.     I 


W    I 


!:i 


which  was  no  new  discovery,  since  they  are  a  Ki*»re  transcript  of 
the  Exchequer  Bills  of  Great  Britain.  As  these  have  been  resorted 
to  for  more  than  a  century,  and  have  never  become  there  a  portion 
of  the  ordinary  currency,  the  extent  to  which  they  may  be  used 
for  other  purposes  is  well  ascertained,  and  bears  always  £  certain 
ratio  to  the  wealth  of  the  country  and  to  the  revenue  of  the  iState. 
Whether  Issued  to  the  bank  as  an  anticipation  of  the  revenue,  or 
used  by  capitalists  for  short  investments,  the  gross  amount  has 
rarely  exceeded  twenty  millions  sterling.  Judging  from  past 
experience,  the  amount  which  may,  in  time  of  war,  be  kept  in 
circulation  at  par  in  the  United  States  falls  far  short  of  a  propor- 
tionate sum. 

The  amount  of  Treasury  Notes  issued  during  the  years  1812 

and  1813  amounted  to $8,930  000 

Of  which  there  had  been  paid  including  interest     $4,240  000 
The  amount  in  actual  circulation  was  less  than  five  millions,  and 
thus  far  they  had  been  kept  at  par. 

All  the  demands  from  the  other  departments  had  b&Bn  met  by 
the  Treasury,  and  there  were  but  few,  if  any,  outstanding  arrears. 
Nothing  had  as  yet  been  collected  on  account  of  the  direct  tax 
and  of  the  internal  duties.  Besides  the  five  millions  of  Treasury 
Notes,  there  had  been  paid  into  the  Treasury  in  the  years  1812  and 
1813,  $28,740,000  on  account  of  war  loans,  and  $22,283,000 
from  the  customs.  The  balance  in  the  Treasury*  amounted  to 
$5,196,542  on  the  31st  December,  1813. 

The  amount  of  Treasury  Notes  Issued  during  the  year  1814 
amounted  to  near  eight  millions,  and  there  had  been  paid  off 
during  the  same  year,  including  interest,  $2,700,000;  making  an 
addition  of  about  five  millions  and  a  half,  and  the  total  amount 
outstanding  about  ten  millions  and  a  half.  The  receipts  during 
that  year,  on  account  of  the  direct  tax  and  internal  duties,  amounts 
ed  to  $3,877,000,  from  war  loans  to  $15,080,000,  and  from  cus- 
toms to  only  six  millions.  Before  the  end  of  the  year,  Government 
was  unable  to  pay  the  notes  which  had  become  due.  It  is  per- 
fectly clear  that,  if  new  notes  could  not  be  issued  in  lieu  of  those 
which  had  become  due.  It  was  because  they  had  fallen  below  par, 
and  therefore  that  the  amount  outstanding  was  greater  than  the 


ii 


m 


*^ 


?tate. 


68 

demand  for  them.  There  was  but  one  rtipedy,  and  it  was  very 
simple.  A  reduction  in  that  amount  must  be  made,  by  funding  at 
their  market  price  a  quantity  sufficient  to  re-establish  the  equili- 
brium. But  all  the  banks  west  oi  r.'ew  England  had  in  the  mean- 
while suspended  their  specie  payments.  A  period  of  anarchy  in 
the  currency  of  the  country  was  the  consequence,  and  lasted  till 
those  payments  were  resumed  in  the  year  1817. 

The  result  of  the  suspension  of  specie  payments  in  England 
was,  that  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  England  became  in  fact  a  legal 
tender  and  the  standard  of  the  currency.  All  the  other  banks 
were  obliged  to  keep  their  own  notes  on  a  par  with  those  of  that 
bank ;  and  all  that  was  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  a  deprecia- 
tion, was  to  regulate  the  issues  of  the  Bank  of  England,  so  as  to 
keep  them  at  par  with  gold  and  silver.  Nevertheless,  the  clamor 
for  more  currency  prevailed;  the  bank  found  it  very  convenient 
and  profitable  to  issue  notes  which  it  was  not  obliged  to  pay,  and 
these  finally  depreciated  twenty-five  per  cent.  But  in  the  United 
States  the  banks  were  under  no  other  control  than  that  of  the  seve- 
ral States  respectively.  The  consequence  was,  that  we  had  fifty 
and  more  species  of  local  currencies,  varying  in  value  in  thediflerent 
States  or  districts  of  country,  and  from  time  t'^  ♦'.ne  in  the  same 
district.  The  banks  might  with  facility  have  resumed  specie  pay- 
ments during  the  first  year  of  peace.  The  effoits  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  to  induce  them  to  resume  proved  unsuccessful; 
and  th«  resumption  did  not  take  place  till  after  a  new  Bank  of  the 
United  States  had  been  organized. 

We  have  had  two  general  suspensions  of  specie  payments,  the 
last  at  a  time  of  profound  peace.  I  was  then  behind  the  scenes, 
had  some  agency  in  restoring  specie  payments,  and  may  speak  on 
that  subject  with  knowleilge  and  confidence.  The  obstacles  came 
partly  from  the  Banks,  principally  fr.  ;n  the  Debtor  interest,  which 
excites  sympathy  and  preponderates  throughout  the  United  States. 
The  mis-named  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  the  banks  under 
its  influence,  were,  it  is  true,  a  formidable  impediment ;  and  this 
obstacle  is  now  fortunately  removed.  Still  the  continuance  of 
specie  payments  stands,  wlienever  a  crisis  occurs,  on  a  most  pre- 
carious basis  ;  and  if  any  important  place,  especially  New  York, 


\y'  \\ 


if  I 


S} 


ii 


happened  to  break,  all  the  banks  through  the  United  States  would 
instantaneously  follow  the  example.  This  is  the  most  imminent 
danger  to  which  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  will  be  ex- 
posed in  time  of  war ;  and  what  effect  the  Sub-Treasury  system 
may  produce  in  that  respect  remains  to  be  tested  by  experience. 

It  is  impossible  to  draw  any  inference  respecting  Treasury  Notes, 
from  what  took  place  in  the  United  States  during  the  confused 
state  of  the  currency  in  the  years  1815  and  1816.  The  taxes 
were  paid  everywhere  with  the  cheapest  local  currency,  in  Trea- 
sury Notes  only  in  the  places  where  sp*^'cie  payments  had  been  con- 
tinued, or  where  bank  notes  were  nearly  at  par.  The  depreciation 
of  the  Treasury  Notes  was  arrested  by  the  fact,  that  they  might 
at  all  times  be  converted  into  a  six  or  seven  per  cent,  stock ;  but 
in  that  case  they  became  assimilated  to  a  direct  loan.  They  never 
can  become  a  general  currency,  on  account  of  their  varying  value, 
so  long  as  they  bear  an  interest  and  are  made  payable  at  some 
future  day.  In  order  to  give  them  that  character,  they  should  as- 
sume that  of  bank  notes,  bearing  no  interest  and  payable  on  de- 
mand. It  does  not  require  the  gift  of  prophecy  to  be  able  to  assert 
that,  as  the  wants  of  Government  increased,  such  notes  would  de- 
gene'  ate  into  paper  money  to  the  uUer  ruin  of  the  public  credit. 

They  may,  however,  be  made  a  special  currency  for  the  purpose 
of  paying  taxes  as  goll  and  silver,  and  to  the  exclusion  of  any  other 
species  of  paper  currency.  The  amount  which  might  be  thus  kept 
111  circulation,  in  addition  to  that  wanted  for  short  investments, 
would  be  limited  by  the  r,ross  amount  of  the  annual  revenue,  and 
bear  but  a  small  proportion  to  it ;  since  one  thousand  dollars,  in 
silver  or  in  any  paper  currency,  are  sufficient  to  elfect  in  one  year 
fifty  payments  of  the  sam?i  amount. 

Although  the  amount  kept  in  circulation  may  fluctuate  according 
to  circumstances,  the  fundamental  principu  is,  that  the  issue  of 
such  notes  1^  an  anticipation  of  the  revenue,  which,  after  it  has 
reached  the  maximum  that  may  be  kept  in  circulation  without 
being  deprecir.led,  never  can  be  increased.  Be  the  amount  ten  or 
twenty  millions,  the  anticipation  may  be  continued,  but  not  re- 
newed ;  it  is  not  an  annual  resource,  but  one,  the  whole  amount  of 
w^hich  never  can  exceed  that  which  may  be  kept  in  circulation. 


■JB!LUi..i.  . 


65 


The  operation  jonsists  in  re-issuing  annually  the  amount  which  is 
paid  off  in  the  year.  Whenever,  owing  to  incidental  fluctuations, 
the  amount  to  be  redeemed  by  the  Treasury  exceeds  that  which 
may  be  re-issued,  the  difference  must  be  immediately  funded  at  the 
market  price  of  the  notes,  so  as  to  keep  them  always  at  par  or  a 
little  above  par. 

It  is  evident,  that  if  the  direct  tax  and  internal  duties  laid  in 
August,  1813,  had  been  imposed  in  July,  1812^  and  if  the  acts  of 
January,  1815,  which  increased  both,  had  been  enacted  in  August, 
1813  ;  there  would  have  been  an  addition  of  at  least  eight  millions 
to  the  revenue  of  the  years  1812  and  1813;  the  Treasury  Notes 
which  had  become  due  would  have  been  paid,  public  credit  would 
havii  been  maintained,  and  the  amount  of  war  loans  lessened. 

The  principal  causes  of  the  fall  of  public  stocks  during  a  war, 
and  of  the  consequent  necessity  of  borrowing  on  dearer  terms,  are 
a  want  of  confidence  in  Government,  and  the  large  amount  of 
stocks  thrown  in  the  market  beyond  the  natural  demand  for  them. 
The  effect  ot  this  last  cause  is  remarkably  illustrated  by  the  fluctua- 
tions in  the  price  of  the  stocks  of  Great  Britain,  where  it  does  not 
appear  that  there  ever  was  a  want  of  confidence  in  the  ability  and 
fidelity  of  Government  in  fulfilling  its  engagements.  The  British 
three  per  cents,  are  now,  and  were  before  th  '  war  of  American  In- 
dependence, and  before  those  which  had  their  origin  in  the  French 
revolution,  near  par  or  at  par.  They  fell  gradually  during  tl:  e  war 
of  independence,  and  were  as  low  as  fifty-four  in  February,  1782. 
The  long  war  with  France  was  attended  with  the  same  result,  and 
the  three  per  cents,  had  fallen  to  fifty-five  in  July,  1812.  Not- 
withstanding the  deranged  state  of  the  finances  of  the  United 
States  in  1814,  the  American  stocks  had  not  fallen  in  the  same 
proportion.  Such  great  depreciation  is  the  result  of  the  long  con- 
tinuance of  a  war.  No  one  can  say  what  would  have  been  its  pro- 
gress, had  the  last  war  with  England  continued  much  longer. 

There  was  not,  however,  at  that  time,  at  least  in  America,  any 
want  of  confidence  in  the  Government :  no  one  doubted  that  it 
would  ultimately  faithfully  discharge  all  its  engagements.  Al- 
though the  General  Government  is  in  no  way  responsible  for  the 
errors  of  any  of  the  individual  States,  it  is  nevertheless  certain,  that 


•I    ■! 


II 


I 


m 


I; 

i; 

■i : 


I  ;   i\ 


66 

the  credit  of  the  Union  has  been  injured  abroad  by  the  failure  of 
several  of  the  States  to  fulfil  their  engagements,  and  that  no  ex- 
pectation can  be  entertained  of  being  able  to  borrow  money  in 
Europe.  It  is  not  less  true  that  the  Administration  will  cease  to 
enjoy  the  confidence  of  American  capitalists,  if  the  measures  it  has 
recommended  should  be  adopted  and  productive  of  war.  No  one 
can  doubt  that,  if  that  event  should  take  place,  the  Americans  will 
fight  in  defence  of  their  country,  and  none  with  greater  zeal  and 
bravery  than  the  people  of  the  Western  States.  During  the  last 
war,  their  militia  and  volunteers  flocked  either  to  the  Lakes,  to 
New  Orleans,  or  wherever  there  was  danger  ;  nor  did  they  refuse 
to  take  part  in  offensive  operations,  and  to  serve  without  the  limits 
of  the  United  States.  But  men  cannot,  either  there  or  elsewhere, 
afford  to  render  gratuitous  services.  V\'hether  regulars,  volunteers, 
or  militia,  they  must  be  fed,  clothed,  transported,  supplied  with  arms 
and  artillery,  and  paid.  There  is  as  yet  but  very  little  active  cir- 
culating capital  in  the  new  States :  they  cannot  lend ;  they,  on  the 
contrary,  want  to  borrow  money.  This  can  be  obtained  in  i\\e 
shape  of  loans  only  from  the  capitalists  of  the  Atlantic  States.  A 
recurrence  to  public  documents  will  show  that  all  the  loans  of  the 
last  war  were  obtained  in  that  quarter. 

Men  of  property  are  perhaps  generally  more  timid  than  others, 
and  certainly  all  the  quiet  people,  amongst  whom  the  public  stocks 
are  ultimately  distributed,  are  remarkably  cautious.  Prudent  capi- 
talists, who  do  not  speculate,  and  consider  public  stocks  only  as 
convenient  and  safe  investments,  will  not  advance  money  to  Gov- 
ernment so  long  as  it  is  controlled  by  men  whom  they  consider  as 
reckless,  and  as  entertaining  rather  lax  opinions  respecting  public 
credit.  Yet  money  will  be  obtained,  but  on  much  dearer  terms 
than  if  public  confidence  was  unimpaired.  There  will  always  be 
found  bold  speculators,  who  will  advance  it  at  a  premium — en- 
hanced by  the  want  of  competition,  and  proportionate  to  the  risks 
they  may  be  supposed  to  incur.  Independent  of  this,  it  is  most  cer- 
tain that  the  rate  of  interest  at  which  loans  may  be  obtained,  will 
always  be  increased  in  proportion  to  their  magnitude.  The  only 
ways  by  which  these  difficulties  may  be  obviated,  or  at  least  les- 
sened, are  perfect  fidehty  in  fulfilling  the  engagements  of  Govern- 


1 


67 

ment ;  an  economical,  that  Is  to  say,  a  skilful  application  of  the 
public  moneys  to  the  most  important  objects,  postponing  all  those 
which  are  not  immediately  wanted,  or  are  of  inferior  real  utility  ; 
and  an  increase  of  the  amount  of  revenue  derived  from  taxation. 
This  has  the  double  advanta":e  of  diminishin<i  the  amount  to  be 
borrowed,  and  of  inspiring  confidence  to  the  money-lenders.  In 
all  cases,  direct  loans  will  be  preferable  to,  and  prove  a  cheaper 
mode  of  raising  money  than  the  over  issues  of  Treasury  Notes. 

The  Act  of  July,  1812,  which  doubled  the  duties  on  importa- 
tions, afforded  a  resource  which,  on  account  of  the  high  rate  at  this 
time  of  those  duties,  cannot  now  be  resorted  to.  Duties  may,  how- 
ever, be  levied  on  the  importation  of  Tea  and  Coffee,  and  perhaps 
some  other  articles  now  duty  free.  Other  modifications  may  be 
found  useful,  but  it  may  be  difficult  to  ascertain,  even  without  any 
regard  to  protection,  what  are  the  rates  of  duties  which  should  be 
imposed  in  time  of  war  on  the  various  imported  articles,  in  order  to 
render  the  revenue  derived  from  that  source  as  productive  as  pos- 
sible. 

It  must  also  be  observed  that  if,  on  account  of  the  credit  then 
allowed  for  the  payment  of  duties  on  importations,  the  Treasury 
had,  when  the  war  of  1812  commenced,  a  resource  in  the  revenue 
previously  accrued  but  not  yet  collected,  which  does  not  now  exist ; 
on  the  other  hand  the  Ignited  States  were  vStill  encumbered  with  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  Revolutionary  debt,  and  the  payments 
on  account  of  its  principal  and  interest  amounted  during  the  years 
1812, 1813, 1814,  to  about  $11,000,000,  whilst  the  annual  interest 
on  the  now  existing  debt  is  less  than  one  million. 

The  direct  tax  of  the  year  1815  amounted  to  $6,000,000,  and  the 
revenue  which  accrued  during  the  same  year,  on  the  aggregate  of  inter- 
nal duties,  as  increased  or  imposed  at  the  same  time,  amounted  to  about 
the  same  sum.  That  year  is  also  the  most  proper  for  a  compara- 
tive view  of  the  revenue  derived  from  each  object.  In  the  subse- 
quent years  the  revival  of  business  increased  the  amount  derived 
from  the  duties  connected  with  the  commerce  of  the  country,  much 
beyond  that  which  could  be  collected  in  time  of  war;  whilst,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  excise  on  spirits  was  much  less  productive. 
The  nett  revenue  derived  from  internal  duties,  which  accrued 
during  that  year  was  in  round  numbers,  about 


68 


If..,  I' 


Lf'i'^' 


8i' 


Excise  on  spirits    . 
Licences  to  retailers 
Sales  at  auction 
Stamp  duties     .     . 
Tax  on  carriages  . 
Refined  sugar 


^2,750,000 
880,000 
780,000 
420,000 
150,000 
80,000 


Several  manufactured 

articles  .  .  .  $840,000 
Household  furniture  20,000 
Watches  worn  by 

individuals       .     .       80,000 


Total  $6,000,000 


The  three  last  items  were  those  added  on  Mr.  Dallas's  recom- 
mendation to  the  first  items  laid  in  1813,  but  the  rate  of  which 
was  increased,  also  on  his  recommendation.  The  manufactured 
articles  not  before  taxed  on  which  the  new  duties  were  laid  were,  pig 
and  bar  iron,  nails  ;  wax  and  tallow  candles ;  hats,  caps  and  um- 
brellas ;  paper  and  playing  cards ;  leather,  saddles,  bridles,  boots 
and  shoes ;  beer,  ale  and  porter ;  snuff,  cigars  and  manufactured 
tobacco.  This  was  the  boldest  measure  proposed  by  the  Secretary, 
for  these  duties  were  from  their  nature  intrinsically  obnoxious. 
Yet  no  voice  was  raised  against  them ;  and  so  far  from  becoming 
unpopular,  Mr.  Dallas,  oy  his  courage  and  frankness,  acquired  a 
well-earned  popularity.  No  stronger  proof  can  be  adduced  of  the 
propriety  of  telling  the  whole  truth  and  placing  an  entire  confi- 
dence in  the  people. 

The  only  important  measure  omitted  at  that  time,  was  an  Act 
of  Congress  ordering  that  all  the  Treasury  notes  actually  due  and 
not  paid  should  be  immediately  funded  at  their  nominal  value ; 
that  is  to  say,  that  for  every  one  hundred  dollars  in  Treasury 
notes,  the  same  amount  of  funded  stock  should  be  issued  as  it  wai 
necessary  to  give  for  oiie  hundred  dollars  in  gold  or  silver.  It  was 
impossible  to  obtain  a  regular  loan  in  time,  and  on  reasonable 
terms,  for  the  purpose  ol  defraying  the  war  expenses  of  the  first 
six  months  of  the  year  1815.  There  was  an  absolute  necessity  for 
recurring  to  Treasury  notes  for  that  purpose,  and  the  attention  of 
the  Treasury  was  forcibly  directed  to  that  object.  But  the  first 
and  fundamental  element  of  public  credit  is  the  faithful  and  punc- 
tual fulfilment  of  the  public  engagements ;  and  the  payment  of 
the  Treasury  notes,  when  becoming  due,  was  as  necessary  as  that 
of  the  interest  of  the  funded  debt,  which  never  was  suspended 
during  the  war.    As  an  immediate  and  considerable  issue  of  Trea- 


69 


sury  notes  was  absolutely  necessary,  it  was  not  sufficient  that  they 
might  be  convertible  into  a  funded  stock,  which  was  already 
much  below  par,  since  that  would  be  in  fact  an  issue  of  depre- 
ciated paper.  The  Act  should,  therefore,  have  pledged  the  public 
faith,  that  if  the  Treasury  notes  were  not  discharged  in  specie 
when  they  became  due,  they  should  be  funded  at  their  nominal  value 
on  the  same  terms  as  above  stated.  Mr.  Dallas  to  great  energy 
united  pre-eminent  talents,  he  wanted  only  experience ;  and  I 
have  no  doubt  that,  had  the  war  continued,  he  would  within  six 
months  have  adopted  that  course.  If  I  have  alluded  here  to  this 
subject,  it  is  on  account  of  the  primary  importance,  if  placed  here- 
after in  a  similar  difficult  position,  of  adhering  rigorously  to  those 
principles  respecting  the  legitimate  use  of  Treasury  notes  and  the 
punctual  discharge  of  every  public  engagement,  which  are  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  public  credit. 

Since  a  direct  tax  of  six  millions  could  be  raised  thirty  years 
ago,  there  can  be  no  difficulty  in  raising  one  of  nine  millions  at 
the  very  beginning  of  the  war :  this  must  be  gradually  increased, 
but  would  be  most  heavily  felt  if  beyond  eighteen  millions. 
Should  an  equal  sum  be  raised  by  internal  duties,  the  annual 
loans  wanted  after  the  first  year  of  the  war  would  be  lessened  in 
the  same  proportion.  The  following  estimate  may  assist  in  form- 
ino^  a  correct  opinion  on  that  subject : — 

The  stamp  duties,  those  on  sales  at  auction,  the 
licences  of  retailers,  and  the  carriage  tax, 
which  accrued  in  the  year  1815,  amounted 
together  to  $2,230,000,  and  may  be  now  es- 
timated at  twice  as  much $4,460,000 

The  aggregate  annual  value  of  leather,  boots, 
shoes,  and  other  manufactures  of  leather;  of 
hats,  caps  and  bonnets ;  snuff  and  cigars ; 
paper  and  playing  cards,  manufactured  in  the 
United  States,  are  estimated  by  the  last  census 
at  fifty-three  millions,  a  tax  on  which  of  ten 
per  cent  would  give 5,300,000 

On  the  same  authority,  three  millions  pounds  of 
spermaceti  and  wax  candles  would  yield,  at 
five  cents  per  pound, 150,000 


Amount  carried  forward, 
I* 


$9,910,000 


1^ 


70 


•:t 


m"^\i 


'i 


Amount  brought  forward,  $9,9  If  ,000 

Three  millions  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 

pounds  of  refined  sugar,  at  the  same  rate  .     .         160,000 

Five  hundred  tons  of  pig  and  bar  iron,  nails  and 

brads,  at  two  dollars  per  ton 1,000,000 

The  gross  amount  of  spirits  and  beer  manufac- 
tured in  the  United  States,  is  stated  in  the 
census  at  sixty-five  millions  of  gallons ;  but 
the  happy  influence  of  the  Temperance  cause 
has  probably  reduced  this  amount  to  less  than 
fifty  millions,  a  tax  on  which  of  ten  cents  per 
gallon 5,000,000 

$16^670,000 

i  have  inserted  only  such  articles  as  were  heretofore  taxed,  and 
have  no  menns  of  indicating  such  other  as  might  l)e  addt  d  or  pre- 
ferred ;  nor  must  I  he  understood  as  recommending  any  specially, 
or  in  reference  to  the  rates  of  duties  to  be  imposed  on  any  one. 

It  has  been  very  generally  asserted  that  men  of  property  were 
averse  to  the  war  because  the  losses  and  burthens  which  it  must 
occasion  fall  ex  illusively  upon  them  ;  and  that  poor  men  were 
generally  in  favor  of  war,  because  they  had  nothing  to  lose. 

It  is  true  that  the  first  great  loss,  caused  by  the  war,  will  fall 
immediately  on  those  interested  in  the  maritime  commerce  of  the 
United  States,  either  as  owners,  insurers,  or  in  any  way  employed 
in  it.  Considering  the  imminent  danger  to  which  is  exposed  the 
immense  amount  of  American  property  afloat  on  every  sea,  and  the 
certain  annihilation,  during  the  war,  of  the  fisheries,  of  the  com- 
merce with  Great  Britain,  and  of  that  with  all  the  countries  beyond 
Cape  Horn  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  the  American  merchants 
may  be  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  a  War,  the  necessity  of  which 
they  do  not  perceive.  But  if  the  apprehension  of  immediate  danger 
is  more  vividly  felt,  the  calamitous  effects  of  the  war  on  the  agricul- 
tural interests  are  not  less  certain.  The  price  of  all  the  products, 
of  which  large  quantities  are  exported,  must  necessarily  fall  so  low 
that  all  the  farmers  must  lessen  the  amount  and  with  it  their  income, 
whilst  they  must  pay  dearer  for  all  the  articles  which  they  are 
obliged  to  purchase.  The  distinction  between  rich  and  poor  is 
vague.  The  most  numerous  class  in  the  United  States  is  that  of 
the  men  who  are  at  the  same  time  owners  and  cultivators  of  the 


71 

soil,  and  who  have  but  small  properties  and  a  very  moderate 
income.  Every  diminution  of  this,  whether  from  the  want  of  a 
market  or  from  any  additional  tax,  is  in  that  and  the  corresponding 
class  of  mechanics,  attended  with  the  i)rivation  of  the  necessaries 
or  comforts  of  life.  The  really  rich,  the  capitalists  v;ho  have  inde- 
pendent incomes,  and  are  not  obliged  to  engage  in  any  of  the  active 
puisuits  of  life,  may,  in  any  calamitous  season,  accumulate  less,  or 
at  most,  must  retrench  only  some  luxuries.  Thus  the  unavoidable 
losses  and  burthens  which  are  the  consequences  of  a  war,  fall  with 
the  greatest  weight  on  those  who  derive  their  means  of  existence 
from  the  pursuits  of  industry,  and  whose  industry  alone  contributes 
to  the  increase  of  the  general  wealth  of  the  country. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Exclusive  of  those  who,  either  as  con- 
tractors, or  in  some  other  way,  are  concerned  with  the  large  supplies 
wanted  for  the  support  of  the  army  and  navy,  there  is  a  class  ot 
capitalists  who  are  enriched  by  the  war.  These  are  the  money 
lenders,  who  shall  have  been  bold  enough  to  take  up  the  public 
loans :  unless  indeed  it  should  be  intended  to  break  public  fai  h, 
and,  on  the  return  of  peace,  to  question  the  obligation  to  pay  them, 
upon  the  pretence  of  their  enormous  profits.  What  these  profits 
are  may  be  again  illustrated  hy  the  example  of  Great  Britain. 

It  has  already  been  seen  that,  whenever  a  war  is  one  of  long 
continuance,  the  British  Government  may  at  first  borrow  at  par, 
and  ends  by  being  compelled  to  sell  its  stock  at  the  rate  of  fifty 
per  cent  of  its  nominal  value ;  which  gives  for  the  whole  of  the  war 
loans  an  average  of  about  75  per  cent.  In  point  of  fact  that  Gov- 
ernment received  in  the  year  1812  less  than  55  per  cent ;  for  the 
money  actually  received  consisted  of  bank  notes,  which  had  then 
depreciated  twenty  per  cent ;  so  that  the  money  lenders  gave  only 
that  which  was  equivalent  to  forty-four  per  cent,  in  gold  or  silver, 
of  the  nominal  v  alue  of  the  stock  which  they  received.  Besides 
receiving  the  interest  on  the  nominal  amount  of  the  stock  till  the 
principal  shall  have  been  paid,  they  might  shortly  after  the  peace, 
and  may  now,  receive  from  ninety-seven  per  cent  to  par,  in  gold 
or  silver,  for  that  same  stock  for  which  they  gave  but  forty-four. 
Thus,  assuming  the  public  debt  of  Great  Britain  at  eight  hundred 
thousand  pounds  sterling ;  not  only  was  the  whole  of  that  capital 


4^h 


Vf^l 


III 


72 

(lestroyod  by  the  wars ;  not  only  are  the  British  people  subject 
now,  anil  it  would  seem  for  ever,  to  a  burthen  of  taxes  sufficient 
to  pay  the  interest  on  that  debt;  but  of  the  eight  hundred  millions 
thus  consumed,  only  six  hundred  were  received  by  the  public,  and 
the  other  two  hundred  millions  made  the  rich  capitalists,  who  had 
advanced  the  money,  still  ncl  er. 

There  is  another  class  of  men  who  may  occasionally  derive 
wealth  from  a  war.  Privateering  consists  in  robbing-  of  their 
property  unarmed  and  unresisting  men,  engaged  in  pursuits  not 
only  legitimate  but  highly  useful.  It  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
legalized  Piracy.  For  this  the  Tnited  States  are  not  responsible ; 
and  it  must  be  admitted,  that  the  practice  of  all  nations  justifies 
them  in  resorting  to  those  means,  in  order  to  make  the  eneir'  eel 
the  calamities  of  war.  But  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  means 
immoral  in  themselves  affords  an  irrefragable  argument  against 
precipitating  the  country  into  war  for  slight  causes,  indeed  against 
any  war  which  is  not  purely  in  self  defence. 

It  is  equally  untrue  to  assert  that  the  poorer  class  of  people,  by 
\vhich  must  be  meant  all  the  laborers,  or  generally  those  who  live 
on  their  wages,  have  nothing  to  lose  by  the  war. 

In  this,  and  other  large  cities,  for  every  thousand  merchants,  or 
men  of  capital  who  may  be  injured  or  thrown  out  of  business,  there 
are  ten  thousand  men  living  on  wages,  whose  employment  depends 
directly  or  indirectly  on  the  commerce  of  those  cities.  The  number 
of  common  laborers  is  proportionately  less  in  the  purely  agricultural 
districts.  But  it  is  evident  that  in  both,  a  considerable  number 
must  be  thrown  out  of  employment  either  by  the  destruction  of 
commerce,  or  in  consequence  of  the  lessened  value  and  quantity  of 
the  a!i;ricultural  products.  And  it  seems  impossible  that  this  should 
take  place  without  affecting  the  rate  of  wages,  than  which  a  more 
afflicting  evil  could  not  fall  on  the  community.  There  is  no  man 
of  pure  and  elevated  feelings  who  does  not  ardently  wish,  that 
means  could  be  devised  to  ameliorate  the  state  of  society  in  that 
respect,  so  as  that  those  who  live  by  manual  labor  should  receive  a 
more  just  portion  of  the  profits,  which  are  now  very  unequally  di- 
vided between  them  and  their  employers. 

But  even  if  the  rate  of  wages  was  not  materially  affected,  yet 


ETIZirSA.^'llU.UMIU"  J  '■ 


7« 


I 


when  it  is  said  that  the  poor  have  nothing  to  lose  by  war,  it  must 
be  because  their  lives  are  counted  for  nothing.  "Whether  militia, 
regulars,  or  sailors,  the  privates,  the  men  who  actually  fight  the 
battles,  are  exclusively  taken  from  amongst  the  poorer  classes  of 
society.  Officers  are  uniformly  selected  from  the  class  which  has 
some  property  or  influence.  They  indeed  risk  gallantly  their  lives, 
but  with  the  hopes  of  pronrotion  and  of  acquiring  renown  and  con- 
sideration. According  to  the  present  system,  at  least  of  the  regu- 
lar army,  it  is  extremely  rare,  almost  impossible  that  a  private 
soldier  should  ever  rise  to  the  rank  of  an  officer.  In  the  course  of 
a  war  thousands  are  killed,  more  die  of  diseases,  and  the  residue, 
when  disbanded,  return  home  with  habits  unfavorable  to  the  pur- 
suits of  industry.  And  yet  it  is  asserted  that  they  are  predisposed 
for  war,  because  they  have  nothing  to  lose. 

As  yet,  however,  we  have  had  recourse  only  to  voluntary  enlist- 
ments for  raising  a  regular  force ;  the  pay  or  bounties  must  be  in- 
creased in  order  to  obtain  a  sufficient  number ;  and  thus  far  to 
become  a  private  soldier  has  been  a  voluntary  act.  The  calling  of 
militia  into  actual  service  is  a  modified  species  of  conscription,  and 
it  has  also  been  deemed  a  sufficient  burthen  to  limit  the  time  of  that 
service  to  six  months.  Another  plan  is  now  contemplated  by  those 
who  are  so  eager  to  plunge  the  country  into  a  war.  Fearing  that 
the  sufficient  number  of  men  may  not  be  voluntarily  raised,  they 
propose  that  the  militia  should  be  divided  into  two  portions  ;  those 
belonging  to  the  first  class  shall;  if  called  into  actual  service,  be 
bound  to  serve  twelve  months  instead  of  six  ;  and  the  other  portion 
shall  be  liable  to  furnish  a  number  of  recruits  for  the  army,  not  ex- 
ceeding one  tenth  part  of  their  total  number.  This  last  provision 
seems  to  be  borrowed  from  the  Russian  military  code.  The  Em- 
peror of  Russia  requires  each  village  to  supply  him  with  a  certain 
number  of  men,  in  proportion  to  that  of  the  male  population.  In 
time  of  war  he  requires,  at  the  rate  of  three  men  for  each  hundred 
males,  which  answers  nearly  to  that  of  ten  for  every  one  hundred 
men  enrolled  in  the  militia ;  and  he  also  grants  to  the  serfs  the 
same  privilege  intended  to  be  allowed  to  a  portion  of  the  militia  by 
the  new  project,  that  of  selecting  the  recruits  amongst  themselves. 

If  it  be  any  consolation,  it  is  certain  that,  although  we  may  not 


V-  ■!: 


74 


' 


il  ! 


!:n![ 


fill 
ill'-' 


invade  England,  the  evils  arising  from  the  war  will  b>j  as  sensibly 
and  more  permanently  felt  by  Great  Britain  than  hj  the  United 
States.  Her  e.Torts  must  be  commensurate  with  those  of  the 
United  States,  much  greater  by  sea  in  order  to  be  efficient,  in 
every  respect  more  expensive  on  account  of  her  distance  from  the 
seat  of  war.  Such  is  the  rapidly  progressive  state  of  America, 
that  the  industry  of  the  people  will,  in^a  few  years  of  peace,  have 
repaired  the  evils  caused  by  the  errors  of  C^iovernment.  Eng- 
land will  remain  burthened  with  additional  debt  and  taxation. 

An  aged  man,  who  has  for  the  last  thirty  years  been  detached 
from  party  politics,  and  who  has  now  nothing  whatever  to  hope  or 
to  fear  from  the  world,  has  no  merit  in  seeking  only  the  truth  and 
acting  an  independent  part.     But  I  know  too  well,  and  have  felt 
too  much  the  influence  of  party  feeling,  not  to  be  fully  aware 
that  those  men  will  be  entitled  to  the  highest  praise,  who,  being 
really  desirous  of  preserving  peace,  shall  or   'his  momentous  oc- 
casion dare  to  act  for  themselves,  notwithstanding  the  powerful 
sympathies  of  party.     Yet  no  sacrifice  of  principles  is  required : 
men  may  remain  firmly  attached  to  those  on  which  their  party 
was  founded  and  which  they  conscientiously  adopted.     There  is 
no  connexion  between  the  principles  or  doctrines  on  which  each 
party  respectively  was  founded,  and  the  question  of  war  or  peace 
with    a  foreign   nation  which   is   now   agitated.     The   practice 
which  has  lately  prevailed  to  convert  every  subject,  from  the  most 
frivolous  to  the  most  important,  into  a  pure  party  question,  de- 
stroys altogether  personal  independence,  and  strikes  at  the  very 
roots  of  our  institutions.     These  usages  of  party,  as  they  are 
called,  make  every  man  a  slave,  and  transfer  the  legitimate  au- 
thority of  the  majority  of  the  nation  to  the  majority  of  a  party, 
and,  consequently,  to  a  minority  of  the  sovereign  people.     If  it 
were  permitted  to   appeal   to  former  times,  I  would  say  that, 
during  the  six  years  that  I  had  the  honor  of  a  seat  in  Congress, 
there  were  but  two  of  those  party  meetings,  called  for  the  purpose 
of  deliberating  upon  the  measures  proper  to  be  adopted.     The 
first  was  after  the  House  had  asserted  its  abstract  right  to  decide 
on  the  propriety  of  making  appropriations  necessary  to  carry  a 
treaty  into  effect,  whether  such  appropriations  should  be  made 


■I  I 


75 


^ 


with  respect  to  the  treaty  with  England  of  1794.    The  other  was 
in  the  year  1798,  respecting  tlie  course  proper  to  be  pursued  after 
the  hostile  and  scandalous  conduct  of  the  French  Directory.     On 
both  occasions  we  were  divided  ;  and  on  both  the  members  of  the 
minority  of  each  meeting  were  left  at  full  liberty  to  vote  as  they 
pleased,  without  being  on  that  account  proscribed  or  considered 
as  having  abandoned  the  principles  of  the  party.     This,  too,  took 
place  at  a  time  when,  unfortunately,  each  party  most  erroneously 
suspected  the  other  of  an  improper  attachment  to  one  or  the  other 
of  the  great  belligerent  foreign  nations.     I  must  say  that  I  never 
knew  a  man  belonging  to  the  same  party  as  myself,  and  I  have 
no  reason  to  believe  that  there  was  any  in  the  opposite  party, 
who  would  have  sacrificed  the  interests  of  the  country  to  those  of 
any  foreign  power.     I  am  confident  that  no  such  pcrGon  is  lo  be 
found  now  in  our  councils  or  amongst  our  citizens  \  nor  am  I  apt  to 
suspect  personal  views,  or  apprehensive  of  the  effect  these  might 
produce.     My  only  fear  is  that  which  I  have  expressed,  the  diffi- 
culty for  honorable  men  to  disenthral  themselves  from  those  party 
sympathies  and  habits,  laudable  and  useful  in  their  origin,  but 
which  carried  to  excess  become  a  tyranny,  and  may  leave  the 
most  important  measures  to  be  decided  in  the  National  Councils 
by  an  enthusiastic  and  inflamed  minority.  * 


MP 


Purchased.30-^^(JL>:5>^^^ 

From  lAxj^^fiJu^.^.^^^P:^ 

Place  of  Purchase  iTAi^AiCHft^^jl^..* 


PRICE.i5..rrr: 

Later  Catalogued  Prices 


i 


'  -*j  rmkiiiMlda 


'    9 

I J 
i 

i 


MR.    GALLATIN'S    LATE    XA^ORK    ON    MEXICO. 

B  A  11  'I'  L  J:  '1'  T     &     W  I-:  L  F  0  R  I ) , 

Xo.  7  ASTOR  M'^I'SK,    NKW  YORK, 
HAVE     LATELY     PUBLISHED,    IN     ONE    THICK    VOLUME,    OCTAVO.— $2.40. 

THE     TKAxNSAOTlONS 

OK    Tllli: 

AMEIIfl^A^    S^THM)LUilI('AL    SOCIETV. 

-the  coatribiifioiis  of  its  Meinbers  : — 


Eiiibruciiig  the 


t'oliowing  Artici 


Art.  I. — NoTK.s  ox  tiik  SEiMi-civif.i/,i:i)  ]\ations  of  Mi;.s.ico.  Yucatan,  ano 
Ckntkai-  A:mi;i;ii'.\.     Hy  Alkimit  (iallatin. 

'I'his  ;.rtic[('  occiiimis  '■'.■'y.l  pii{;-c.s ;  it  is  illiistrufoil  with  sevenil  folding  (iif)lc«,  exiii- 
l>itin;j:  coinijarative  vociiinii;!'"''^'^  of  tlic  s.'veral  ii-'nuuiiiCf'^^  "f  .XFoxicn,  Giidtcinala, 
Yuc;itiin,  Ciuviina,  &c.,  iilludeft  to  in  it;  tables  of  iho  Ancient  jMcxican  Almanac,  a 
foldinii-phite  of  tho  colobratod  Calendar -Stono  of  Mexico,  and  enirravintrs  oflVIcxican 
paintings,  illustrating  some  important  events  in  her  annals. 

Art.  II. — An  Account  w  Ancient  Remains  in  'I'knni-.s.ski:.  Uy  Gkrard 
Ti;(>osT,  M.])..  Professor  of  Chemistry,  (leolofry.  \:c..  in  tlio  University  of 
Tennessee. 

'I'his  paper  gives  an  account  of  some  remarkable  antiquities  loiind  in  '['ennessee, 
showing  till'  I'onncr  existi!nc(Mjf  an  ancient  idol-worship,  practised  by  the  Kgyptians, 
(irecks,  H;)inaiis.,  and  the  ))eo[)le  of  Mindostan;  also  a  description  of  tlie  ancient 
burial-places  oi  'i"eniicsse(>,  I'.entucky,  ami  adjacent  parts,  illustrated  witli  fonr  eii- 
irravings  of  idols. 

Ajit.  III. — Obsi;kvations  Ki;.-^rKCTiN(;  thk  (ikayi::  Ckkkk  .Moind  in-  VVkstekn 
YiRuiNiA.     By  Henry  K.  iScHooLCitAyr. 

Observations  respecting  tiio  (iravoCrcck  iVIotuid  in  Western  Virginia  ;  the 
aMti(|ue  inscription  discovered  in  its  excavation,  and  tin.'  competed  evidences  of  tlie 
occupancy  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  during  the  Mound  period,  and  pri<ir  to  the  dis- 
covery by  Columbus.      Illustrated  \vitli  iour  enirravings. 

'liie  (Ji'ave-Creek  Mound  is  not  only  nmarkable  as  being  tiie  iariiest  artificial 
work  of  the  kind  in  the  United  .States,  but  Inr  an  inscribed  tablet  lound  within  it,  the 
only  instance  yet  discovered  of  an  inscription  having  any  reseiniilanc;!  to  alphabetic 
characters.  A  det  iled  account  of  the  JVlound  and  other  remains  in  the  vicinity  ;  oi 
tin-  various  relics  l>und  within  it ;  the  character  of  tlu;  inscription  :  a  -omparison  of 
seve  d  ancien'  alphfuets  uith  it:  and  coHJi'C,ur(s  on  its  era  and  origin,  form  the 
subji'cts  iif  this  paper. 

.'\i:t.  IV. — Un  thk  Rk'  i:NT  Di>.:uvi;uie.'>  ok  IIimvauitic  Inscku'TIOiS.  and  tjik 
ArTi;Aii'r.s  made  to  ])i;ciriiKU  'jiikm.  15y  Wiemam  W.  ^ri'tiNKK. 
'I'ha  attention  of  the  sniutnn  of  Euiope  is  now  turni'd  to  the  ancient  r(Mnain8  and 
inscriptions  recently  discovered  in  .Southern  Arabia,  a  Iietter  knowledge  of  which 
will  tend  to  throw  liirht  on  a  portion  ol' scriptural  history  of  which  little  was  known. 
;\lr.  Turner's  labors  have  been  liii;idy  applauded  lor  their  acutenes^,  both  in  franco 
and  (jcnnany.  A  'olding-plate  ol  comparative  alphabets,  a  map,  and  ei^dit  engrav- 
ings of  inscriptions,  illustrate  this  papi'r. 

.\i;t.  V. — AccoiNT  or   riii;    I'lMco-ljiiiN  an    .Monimi'.nx  m    Dl'GcA.  and   thk 

He.MAINS    (,V    an    AmiKNT    StKI.i-ITRE   AT    liEESS.    NEAK    TilE    StTE  OK   AMlENT 

Carthage.     By  1''kei>euii:  CATiiEiiwrtoD. 

The  ti.onunieiits  and  inscri))tions  described  in  this  paper  aic  tlu;  result  ol  a  pcr- 
soind  evainination  by  Mr.  Catlierwood  (the  well-linowu  c(jinpanu)n  of  Mr.  .Stephens 
in  histravels  in  Central  America).  1'  is  oiieotthe  most  perfect  yet  discovin-ed  in  the 
region,  and  is  as  remarkalde  for  its  arcdiiteriural  beautv  (in  which  there  is  a  siniridar 
combination  cf  the  Kgyptian  and  (rreciaii  stylijs)  as  tor  its  hiu;h  anti(piity.  A  \  icw 
of  this  inonument,  its  ground-plan,  a  fac-siinile  of  the  inscription,  and  live  engravings 
of  other  etiitices,  accoinpanv  this  paper. 

Jcy*  'I'lip  Atufrii'.'iii  Etliii()l(iul(:;i|  Sdi  icty  was  ('Maljlis-licil  liir  llic  jiroaioliim  ol'  (lie  siiidy  dl' llie 
Naliiiiil  IlisKiiy  1)1'  Man  aiiil  tlie  liliilic  lie  inliiibllH,  iihIiicIuii;  llic  (|jsti'i)iuisliiii),'  cliaractiTislics  of  the 
v.iriilics  i|  tlir  Hainan  Race,  anil  tlic  r;iiisci  (it'saiii  illviT'.iilic.J.  .\iiliii()lii;!i<iil  anil  pliilolop  Jul  sci- 
riici' arc  iiiiioii!;  tlic  itinsl  lMi|iorl:iiit  nmunti  lor  clmiiliinii!;  llusc  Milijri  l>.  anil  will  iiccivi' a  toiilion 
I'lnni  the  Siicicty.  Oiigaail  |in|Mrs  on  lliisi;  siihji  its  will  Iim  iircipl:ilili' to  tin;  Hocielj ,  ami  nay  l)u 
ailriic-^siiii  111  thi;  f 'oirc'iiiumliiij;  Stcretiiry,  JnH.s  If.  U.vR  ri.l.  i  i ,  N'-vv  Yuili. 


iil 


ICO. 


kVO.— $2,60. 


I E  T  V. 

lers : — 
;atan,  AlNo 

iihlcs,  c'xlii- 
Oiiiitemala, 
Alinaniic,  a 
of'Mcxicnn 

y  (ic.RARn 
niver.sity  ol' 

Tennessee, 

i'-fivptiims, 

;lie   ■.uii'ient, 

itii  four  cii- 

W I ;  STERN 


nces  ul"  Uie 
'  tu  tile  dift- 

'^t  -.irhticiiil 
itliin  it,  the 
alphabetic 
.icinity  ;  di 
inparisdn  ot' 
!,  I'orni  till' 

5,  AM)  THi; 

omains  ami 
;e  of  which 
vas  known. 

I  in  Krance 
j:lit  eiigrav- 

,  AMJ  11  IK 
J\-   A.MU'iNT 

II  111  a  |ivr- 
r.  .Stephens 
(ired  in  the 
i  a  siiiirnlur 
/.  A  \  ic\\ 
en!;i;ivitias 


hUuU  III'  ilie 
•lisiics  of  the 
lilolop  cul  bci- 
t'ivi'  ;i  tonlioii 
,  aiul    iiiiy  l)u 


